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I. INTRODUCTION 
Reform of the Hatch-Waxman generic drug framework is in the air.  
Changes in how the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) implements 
the law, as well as changes to the law itself, are under serious consideration.  
These policymaking discussions are taking place against a backdrop of 
shared assumptions about the origins and nature of the original Hatch-
Waxman legislation—assumptions that this Article claims are wrong. 
The Hatch-Waxman statute, enacted more than thirty years ago and 
modestly revised fifteen years ago, authorized the FDA to approve generic 
drugs based on “abbreviated” marketing applications.1  These applications 
 
 1  See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585; Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066. 
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do not contain safety and effectiveness data; instead they rely on data 
submitted by the companies whose drugs they copy.2  Congress also created 
an exemption from patent infringement so that generic firms could make and 
test their drugs during the terms of patents covering the original drugs.3  The 
scheme provided drug patent owners with an extension of their patents (one 
per drug)—also known as “patent term restoration”—to make up for time 
spent generating safety and effectiveness data before approval.4  It also 
promised them a window of time before generic applications could be 
submitted (or approved, depending on the provision).5  And it created a 
mechanism for generic firms and innovators to resolve patent infringement 
issues before generic drug launch.6 
Many scholars urge reform on the ground that drug innovators “abuse” 
the scheme to enjoy more time on the market without generic competition.  
Professors Lemley, Dogan, and Carrier argue, for instance, that innovators 
introduce new versions of their products in a way that enables them to enjoy, 
inappropriately, a longer period before generic drug launch than they would 
otherwise enjoy.7  Professors Carrier, Paradise, and Kesselheim argue that 
innovators improperly decline to share samples of their patented products 
with generic firms that seek to use the abbreviated pathway.8  Professor 
Feldman argues that innovators take advantage of the Hatch-Waxman 
requirement that generic drugs have the same labeling as the drugs they copy, 
to prevent approval of generic drugs for longer than appropriate.9  Some 
scholars, like Professor Shepherd, defend the status quo in the face of these 
arguments.10  Others urge policy reform on the ground that the scheme 
provides inadequate incentives for innovation.  Professor Goldman and 
colleagues suggest, for example, that Congress should amend the statute to 
 
 2  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2018).  
 3  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2018).  
 4  35 U.S.C. § 156 . 
 5  E.g., § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).  
 6  §§ 355(b)(2)(j), 271(e)(2).  
 7  Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167 (2016); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and 
Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685 (2009). 
 8  Michael A. Carrier & Brenna Sooy, Five Solutions to the REMS Patent Problem, 97 
B.U. L. REV. 1661 (2017); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 
30: Do We Need a Re-Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y 
L. & ETHICS 293, 320–22 (2015); Jordan Paradise, REMS as a Competitive Tactic: Is Big 
Pharma Hijacking Drug Access and Patient Safety?, 15 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 43 
(2015).  
 9  Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic 
Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499, 506 (2016).  
 10  Joanna Shepherd, Deterring Innovation: NY v. Actavis and the Duty to Subsidize 
Competitors’ Market Entry, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 663, 664 (2016).  
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provide innovators with a longer respite before generic approval.11  
Professors Budish, Roin, and Williams suggest that the patent extension does 
not go far enough and that drug patent terms should begin with 
commercialization.12 
Interest in reform is intensifying.  In 2017, the Commissioner of Food 
and Drugs convened a public hearing and opened a docket for comment on 
the Hatch-Waxman scheme.13  Most of the comments call for changes at the 
FDA, and many call for legislative change.14  Also in 2017, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) convened a workshop relating to generic drug 
competition and solicited responses to a series of questions, many of which 
related to legislative changes.15  Congressional committees have held 
hearings in recent years,16 and members have introduced bills to amend the 
scheme.17  The innovating and generic drug industries have been vocal about 
change, along with third parties such as the American Medical Association 
(AMA).18 
This policy discussion takes place within the context of a well-accepted 
narrative about the political history of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and 
the nature of the resulting legislation.  Conventional wisdom holds that the 
legislation represented a compromise between the competing interests of the 
generic drug companies and the innovating drug companies.19  Some 
characterize the compromise as privately negotiated between the two 
 
 11  Dana P. Goldman et al., The Benefits from Giving Makers of Conventional ‘Small 
Molecule’ Drugs Longer Exclusivity Over Clinical Trial Data, 30 HEALTH AFF. 84, 84 (2011), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.2009.1056. 
 12  Eric Budish et al., Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from 
Cancer Clinical Trials (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19430, 2013), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19430.pdf.  
 13  Administering the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, 82 Fed. Reg. 43767-01 (Sept. 19, 
2017).  
 14  See generally Comments to Docket No. FDA-2017-N-3615. 
 15  Understanding Competition in Prescription Drug Markets: Entry and Supply Chain 
Dynamics, FTC (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2017/11/ 
understanding-competition-prescription-drug-markets-entry-supply.  
 16  See generally, e.g., The Cost of Prescription Drugs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 115th Cong. (2017); Antitrust Concerns and the FDA 
Approval Process: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial, and 
Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017).  
 17  E.g., S. 124, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 2051, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 18  See generally Comments to Docket No. FDA-2017-N-3615. 
 19  Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Daniel A. Crane, Patent Punting: How FDA and Antitrust 
Courts Undermine the Hatch-Waxman Act to Avoid Dealing with Patents, 21 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 197, 244 (2015) (“The Hatch-Waxman Act is a complex 
compromise between the interests of innovators and generics . . . .”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 727 (2005) (describing 
the Hatch-Waxman Act as a “complex legislative compromise between the interests of 
research pharmaceutical firms and generic competitors”). 
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industries.20  Courts, too, accept this conventional wisdom.  Many refer to a 
balance between competing policy goals, but they generally associate these 
goals with the interests of the respective industries, and some imply a private 
agreement.21  Key to this narrative, though, is the notion that both sides won 
and both sides lost.  The generic firms are said to have received a safe harbor 
from infringement liability for generic drug development as well as the right 
to rely on innovator testing data.22  The innovating firms are said to have 
received additional protection in the market: a patent extension and data 
exclusivity.23 
 
 20   E.g., Dan L. Burk, Means and Meaning in Patent Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV.  SEE 
ALSO 13, 22 (2013) (“The Hatch-Waxman Act is a complicated series of legislative 
compromises between original pharmaceutical developers and generic manufacturers.”); 
Anna B. Laakmann, The Hatch-Waxman Act’s Side Effects: Precautions for Biosimilars, 47 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 917, 919 (2014) (writing that the scheme “structured a compromise 
between brand name and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers”); Rachel Sachs, The New 
Model of Interest Group Representation in Patent Law, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 344, 383 (2014) 
(writing that the statute was the “product of compromise” between “branded pharmaceutical 
firms and generic manufacturers”); Joanna M. Shepherd, Biologic Drugs, Biosimilars, and 
Barriers to Entry, 25 HEALTH MATRIX 139, 156 (2015) (describing the scheme as “a 
compromise on barriers to entry between original drug manufacturers and subsequent 
potential entrants”); Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Evaluating Flexibility in International 
Patent Law, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 206 (2013) (“Thus, the Hatch-Waxman Act can be 
categorized as a complex legislative scheme, negotiated with all the relevant stakeholders, 
and administered by the Food and Drug Administration.”).  Counsel for the generic industry 
association during the policymaking process described the scheme as a private agreement 
“hammered out” by representatives of both industries.  See Alfred B. Engelberg, Special 
Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 J.L. & 
Tech. 389, 400 (1999), http://www.ipmall.info/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/IDEA/11. 
Engelberg99.pdf. 
 21  Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The 
Hatch-Waxman Act was accordingly a compromise between two competing sets of interests: 
those of innovative drug manufacturers, who had seen their effective patent terms shortened 
by the testing and regulatory processes; and those of generic drug manufacturers, whose entry 
into the market upon expiration of the innovator’s patents had been delayed by similar 
regulatory requirements.”); Abbott Labs. v. Young, 276 F.3d 627, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“As 
the majority correctly notes, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments were the product of 
compromise.”); Tri-Bio Labs. Inc. v. United States, 836 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating 
that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments “reflect a statutory compromise of the competing 
concerns”); Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (C.D. Cal. 2002), 
aff’d, 324 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“After the subcommittee favorably reported the bill, 
Representative Henry Waxman of California conducted extensive negotiations with 
representatives of both generic and brand name pharmaceutical companies that generated a 
compromise that addressed the generic marketing and patent term aspects.  This compromise 
was the basic language of the bill that became the Hatch-Waxman Act.”); Mylan Pharms. Inc. 
v. Henney, 94 F. Supp. 2d 36, 52 (D.D.C. 2000), vacated sub nom., Pharmachemie B.V. v. 
Barr Lab., Inc., 276 F.3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“As this Circuit observed nearly a decade ago, 
that Hatch-Waxman struck a compromise between pioneer and generic makers . . . .”). 
 22  E.g., Sachs, supra note 20, at 383–84. 
 23  E.g., Robin Feldman, Regulatory Property: The New IP, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53, 
69 (2016); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug? 
Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. 
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Curiously, however, there have been few published histories of the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments since the accounts written contemporaneously 
by participants in the policymaking process.24  This Article steps into the gap 
by offering a contextualized history of the statute and describing its political 
economy.  It takes a public choice approach, examining the role of 
participation and influence on policymaking.25 
Beginning in the late 1970s, citing studies showing a decline in 
innovation, regulated patent owners sought restoration of the portions of 
their patent terms lost to premarket testing and federal agency review.26  The 
final legislative proposal, which would have applied to many regulated 
industries, very nearly became law.27  Understanding the political economy 
of the 1984 legislation requires understanding why these proposals had 
majority and bipartisan support in Congress through the fall of 1982, as well 
as how and why the tide turned. 
Patent owners supported patent term restoration because it would 
lengthen the period of time they could commercialize their patented products 
and block competing copies.  They had a strong incentive to organize and 
argue for policy change.  Generally, they argued for restoration on the ground 
that it would restore (increase) incentives to innovate.28  Academic 
economists bolstered this argument.29  With respect to drug patents, the FDA 
 
L. REV. 299, 304 (2010); Sachs, supra note 20, at 383–84. 
 24  The primary accounts by participants are: Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, 
Balancing Competition and Patent Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 269 (1985); 
Alan D. Lourie, Patent Term Restoration, 66 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 526, 529 (1984) [hereinafter 
Lourie, Account]; Alan D. Lourie, Patent Term Restoration: History, Summary, and 
Appraisal, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 351 (1985) [hereinafter Lourie, History, Summary, and 
Appraisal]; Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the 
Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187 (1999).  Brief accounts appear in later 
scholarly work.  E.g., Ronald L. Desrosiers, Note, The Drug Patent Term: Longtime 
Battleground in the Control of Health Care Costs, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 115 (1989); Daniel 
I. Gorlin, Staving off Death: A Case Study of the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Strategies to 
Protect Blockbuster Franchises, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 823 (2008); Sachs, supra note 20. 
 25  See generally Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public 
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987) (explaining public choice theory and its use in public law 
scholarship).  Few writers have considered the application of public choice theory to the 
legislation.  Professor Sachs included the Hatch-Waxman legislation in an article on 
application of public choice theory to patent statutes; I address her analysis infra note 445.  
See also F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An 
Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 
327, 408 (2006) (commenting that “the Hatch-Waxman Act was very much a collective 
bargaining process that raised a host of public choice, administrative and market power 
problems”).  
 26  See infra Section III. 
 27  See infra Section III.A.4. 
 28  See infra Section III. 
 29  See infra Section III. 
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supported restoration, perhaps to protect its premarket regulatory program, 
which was viewed as responsible for the truncation of patent terms.  The 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) supported restoration on theoretical 
grounds, because it would compensate for time sacrificed to federal 
government requirements and ensure equal treatment of patent owners. 
The competitors of these patent owners would have borne the cost of 
this legislation (a longer wait before launching competing products using the 
inventions), but they were not as well organized, perhaps because of the 
differing industries involved.  With respect to drugs in particular, the public 
was also perceived to bear the costs through a delay in generic drug entry, 
which meant it would pay more for medicine for a longer period of time.  
Public Citizen, which had formed in 1971, made this pricing argument for 
the public, leading to a clash in views about where the public’s interest lay.  
Opponents also focused on the empirical case for restoration, for instance 
questioning the supposed decline in innovation, questioning its causes, and 
questioning whether longer patents would lead to more innovation. 
Until the fall of 1982, however, there was bipartisan support in 
Congress and widespread support from influential third parties including the 
national media.  The final bill passed the Senate.  In the House, however, it 
had been placed on the suspension calendar and fell five votes short of the 
supermajority needed for passage.  A variety of explanations have been 
offered for its defeat, but overconfidence surely played a role. 
In addition, however, the tide was already turning.  The generic industry 
had coalesced around the issue of patent term restoration during the winter 
of 1981 to 1982, invoking the public’s interest in lower drug prices.  And by 
the spring of 1983, the generic companies had experienced a series of 
policymaking defeats in Congress, at the FDA, and in the courts, that 
propelled them to organize and push for legislation advancing their own 
interests.  They sought legislation that would allow them to reach the market 
earlier and on the basis of applications omitting clinical data.  They would 
rely on the data submitted by patent owners.  The public would benefit, they 
argued, through earlier access to (their) less expensive medicines.  They 
formed a new lobbying group, headed by a charismatic Washington insider, 
and they secured the support of Henry Waxman (D-CA), a relatively new 
but already influential member of the U.S. House who sought to make his 
name in health and environmental policymaking. 
Representative Waxman introduced a placeholder bill in the summer of 
1983.  The broad contours of the legislation were then hammered out in 
private between July 1983 and January 1984.  Waxman and his staff filled in 
the details during the spring, however, with provisions that surprised and 
disappointed patent owners.  Only modest changes were made after this 
point.  Some of the non-pharmaceutical patent owners split off, realizing 
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their own prospects for meaningful patent term restoration had dimmed with 
joinder to drug pricing issues.  Although for the most part the language was 
presented to policymakers as a “done deal” in June, there was modest 
tinkering in the summer, and Senator Hatch and Representative Waxman put 
forward a series of final changes in August partly in response to concerns 
about the constitutionality of the legislation. 
This paper makes two claims about the final legislation. 
First, the conventional wisdom about the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments—that each side gained and each side lost—is wrong.  The two 
industries sought directly conflicting policy outcomes.  Considering each 
industry’s position before enactment and after enactment shows clearly that 
the generic industry emerged in a better position, while the patent owners 
emerged in a worse position.  Understanding this requires understanding the 
state of the law and the position each industry was in before enactment.  That 
the benefits accrued to one group while the costs were borne by the other 
group is not meant as a normative claim or a claim about the allocation of 
benefits and costs under the scheme as it operates today.  Rather, it is a 
historical claim—that in September 1984, the generic industry clearly 
emerged in a better place, and the innovating industry emerged in a worse 
place. 
Second, this outcome can be explained by a Baptists-and-bootleggers 
alliance between the generic industry and Public Citizen.  The generic 
companies argued that their proposed policy changes would increase and 
accelerate the supply of less expensive drugs.  They urged these policy 
changes because they would be selling the drugs in question and would profit 
from the legislation’s passage.  But they managed to equate their own 
financial interests with the interests of the general public, and their policy 
proposal benefited from the strong support of Public Citizen and the 
entrepreneurship of Representative Waxman.  Patent owners had very little 
leverage after losing the patent term restoration vote in September 1982, and 
once the alliance between Public Citizen and the generic industry association 
was cemented, the drug patent owners would have been lucky to hang onto 
the status quo. 
Although it makes only historical claims, this Article could have 
normative implications.  More than thirty years of scholarship, and policy 
reform proposals today, are grounded in the assumption that the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments benefitted both industries.  Indeed, some scholars 
assume that it benefitted the patent owners.  Instead, it was a policymaking 
defeat for the innovators.  Scholars, third-party opinion-shapers, and 
policymakers considering current policies and practices, as well as reform 
proposals, should understand this.  And they should know that it resulted 
from an alliance between generic drug companies and Public Citizen, though 
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these are not, in fact, always fully aligned.  This Article provides the basis 
for a clearer understanding of what happened in 1984 and perhaps normative 
work considering alternatives to the Hatch-Waxman framework or 
reassessment of the original patent term restoration proposals. 
Section II of this Article describes the interaction between patent life 
and new drug approval that laid the groundwork for the restoration 
proposals.  Section III tells the history of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, 
beginning with the defeat of the Kastenmeier patent term restoration 
proposal in 1982 and then turning  to the generic drug industry’s 
policymaking defeats from 1979 to 1983, the introduction of generic drug 
legislation in the spring of 1983, and the development of the final legislation 
from July 1983 to September 1984.  Section IV explains the political 
economy of the 1984 legislation, and the Conclusion offers brief thoughts on 
the implications of this Article’s claims. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Distorted Patent Terms 
1. Early Filings 
Since the founding of the Republic, and in accordance with express 
recognition in the U.S. Constitution, federal law has protected an inventor’s 
rights in his or her invention.30  In general, if a process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter is useful and not obvious, and if the 
patent application satisfies certain additional requirements, the Patent Act 
will secure the inventor’s exclusive right to the invention for a fixed time.31  
During this time, the inventor may exclude others from making, using, or 
selling the invention without permission.32  As a practical matter, the right to 
exclude confers additional benefits, including the ability to provide that 
permission to others (to “license” the patent) and the ability to sell 
embodiments of the invention in a market that lacks copies and possibly 
close substitutes. 
Various doctrines of patent law provide a strong incentive to file for a 
patent as soon as possible after invention.  For instance, the PTO will 
generally deny a patent if the invention was described in a printed 
publication, or in public use, more than a year before the patent application 
was filed.33  Today, the PTO awards the patent to the first to file a patent 
 
 30  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 31  35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112, 154 (2018). 
 32  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018) 
 33  The 1952 statute precluded a patent if the invention was in public use in the United 
States or described in a printed publication more than a year before the filing date.  35 U.S.C. 
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application, which also pushes inventors into filing as soon as possible so 
that another person does not secure the patent first.34  In some cases, this 
early patenting occurs well before the invention takes the form of a product 
that will be commercially successful.  As Professor Sichelman shows, 
transforming a prototype into a commercially viable product can require 
years of experimentation with product features as well as extensive market 
testing.35  The nature and extent of the testing is a business judgment, as the 
inventor focuses on identifying features that will cost-effectively attract 
customers and minimize liability.36 
Whether early patenting is beneficial remains disputed in the academic 
literature.37  One concern, voiced by Professor Abramowicz, is germane to 
the history of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.  Abramowicz suggests that 
delays before commercialization increase the risk of patent 
“underdevelopment” (less investment in development of the invention than 
if the patent term had been longer) and “non-development” (abandonment of 
inventions that might have been developed if the patent term had been 
longer).38  These risks intensify, he explains, if the post-patent cost of 
development and time to market are substantial.  He gives the example of 
pharmaceuticals.  Although he does not explore the point, pharmaceuticals 
differ from other products with lengthy commercialization delays because 
the commercialization delay derives from federal regulatory requirements. 
2. Premarket Regulation 
The essence of drug discovery is the uncovering or creation of a new 
active ingredient with useful physiological effects and thus therapeutic 
potential.  Biological assays (for instance, using cells in the laboratory) and 
 
§ 102(b) (1952).  Today, public use anywhere in the world and description in a printed 
publication defeat novelty, although there is an exception for disclosures by the inventor in 
the final year before the effective filing date (or by a third party during that same period after 
disclosure by the inventor).  35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). 
 34  35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 35  Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 347–53 (2010) 
(describing the process from invention to commercialization for a particular product, to show 
the “risky and costly efforts often involved”). 
 36  E.g., id. at 350–51. 
 37  Compare Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348, 
352 n.11 (1968) (arguing that early patents prevent wasteful duplication of effort during what 
would otherwise be a longer pre-patent development phase), and Edmund W. Kitch, The 
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276–78 (1977) (arguing that 
early patenting may allow the patent owner to coordinate inventive activity with others, 
creating social value), with Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 
61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 88 (2009) (arguing that broad early patent filings necessitate more 
detailed applications later, burdening the patent system). 
 38  Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1065, 1074 (2007).  
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animal tests substantiate the physiological effects and allow the inventor to 
describe the molecule’s activity in a patent application.39  Patent law allows 
one to establish utility on the basis of laboratory and animal testing data.40 
But the federal government has required premarket applications for 
new drugs since 1938 and for biological medicines since 1902.41  And the 
government does not approve active ingredients.  Instead, it approves a 
finished product, meaning a particular formulation (a combination of active 
and inactive ingredients, such as excipients and buffers, tailored to have 
particular properties), as well as a particular presentation (route of 
administration, dosage form, and strength), and particular labeling for 
prescribers.42  Moreover, the government will approve a medicine only if the 
applicant proves the product effective for a particular use (known as its 
“indication”) described in the labeling.43  Effectiveness for FDA purposes 
differs from utility for patent law purposes; it is a regulatory concept and a 
higher bar.  The regulatory statute requires “substantial evidence” to support 
the indication.44  This in turn requires statistically rigorous analysis of data 
from one or two “adequate and well-controlled” clinical trials testing a 
hypothesis about the use.45 
Federal law requires the applicant to take a phased approach to 
development of these data.46 A firm must first submit laboratory and animal 
testing results showing that it would be ethical to conduct trials in humans.47  
Once the FDA permits trials to begin, the firm must begin with small trials, 
 
 39  See generally JP Hughes et al., Principles of Early Drug Discovery, 162 BRIT. J. 
PHARMACOLOGY 1239 (2011).  
 40  Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) (holding that invention must have 
“substantial utility” in the form of a “specific benefit” that is “currently available”); In re 
Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that “proof of an alleged pharmaceutical 
property for a compound by statistically significant tests with standard experimental animals 
is sufficient to establish utility”); Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(finding utility on basis of in vitro demonstration of claimed biological activity, preventing 
aggregation of platelets). 
 41  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, 1052 
(1938); Biologics Control Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 Stat. 728, 728-29 (1902). 
 42  Erika Lietzan, The Drug Innovation Paradox, 83 MO. L. REV. 39, 71 (2018) 
[hereinafter Lietzan, Innovation Paradox].  
 43  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2018); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(viii) (2018); Lietzan, 
Innovation Paradox, supra note 42.  Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2018).  
 44  21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (requiring “substantial evidence” of effectiveness); see also 
Procedures for Review of Safety, Effectiveness, and Labeling, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,679 (Aug. 18, 
1972) (explaining that the agency will apply a more flexible version of “substantial evidence” 
to biologics). 
 45  21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (defining “substantial evidence” as data from at least one “adequate 
and well-controlled [investigation]”); 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2018) (describing an “adequate 
and well-controlled [investigation]”). 
 46  See Lietzan, Innovation Paradox, supra note 42, at 52. 
 47  See generally 21 C.F.R. § 312 (2018). 
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often in healthy volunteers.48  These trials generate safety information and 
information about how the body processes the drug.  The second phase of 
testing involves more subjects, often with the disease under investigation, 
and generates preliminary measurements of the drug’s effects on the body as 
well as information about optimal dosing.49  The process ends with trials 
designed to test whether use of a particular finished product (which the 
company plans to commercialize) achieves a particular clinical endpoint in 
a specific population.50  The marketing application describes the product, 
how it is made, and the data generated during research and development.51 
The patent owner has little control over the length of the premarket 
testing and approval process.52  As a regulatory matter, the premarket 
requirements are more likely to turn on the drug’s chemical class, the disease 
targeted, how well the disease is understood, the drug’s mechanism of action, 
the clinical outcomes possible, and other available treatments.53  Today the 
process from discovery to FDA approval averages ten to twelve years, but it 
can be much shorter or, indeed, much longer.54  Recent empirical work shows 
that drugs for some types of use—such as drugs for diseases of the central 
nervous system—consistently take longer.55 
The aspects of patent doctrine that counsel early filings nevertheless 
apply with equal force in the pharmaceutical setting.  Use of an invention in 
a clinical trial may constitute disqualifying public use.56  Scientific 
publications describing clinical research results may disqualify the invention 
for a patent.57  Conventional wisdom holds that the patent for the active 
ingredient of a potential new drug should be filed before clinical testing 
 
 48  21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a).  
 49  21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b).  
 50  21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c).  
 51  21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50, 601.2. 
 52  Lietzan, Innovation Paradox, supra note 42, at 62–63. 
 53  Id. at 110. 
 54  Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of 
R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20 (2016). 
 55  Lietzan, Innovation Paradox, supra note 42, at 110–11. 
 56  Christopher M. Holman, Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its Effect on 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 76 MO. L. REV. 645, 659–60 (2011) (discussing whether clinical 
trials are patent-invalidating public use of the claimed invention); see also Dey, L.P. v. 
Sunovian Pharms., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (reversing summary judgment 
on public use issue and listing cases in which courts have declined to find “public use” when 
investigators sign confidentiality agreements); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., 
Inc., 471 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that Lilly’s trials of olanzapine were not public 
use, considering confidentiality of the study and experimental character of the tests). 
 57  See Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1321, 1324–25 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining how prior publication forced Ortho-McNeil to narrow scope of 
patent); Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. 
L. REV. 503, 523–24 (2009) (offering examples). 
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starts.58  This appears to be common practice.59 
3. Patent Term Distortion 
Premarket regulation combines with early patent filings to create what 
the Supreme Court describes as “patent distortion.”60  Today a patent lasts 
for twenty years, starting when the inventor files the patent application.61  If 
the inventor spends a decade testing embodiments for regulatory purposes—
animal testing to justify a clinical program, followed by three phases of 
clinical trials—only ten years of patent life remain when the FDA approves 
the finished product for the market.  This is the product’s “effective patent 
life,” meaning the portion of the patent term during which the patent owner 
may lawfully sell embodiments of the invention while excluding others from 
doing so.  Before 1995, when a patent lasted for seventeen years from 
issuance, the same thing happened.  Ordinarily the patent issued during 
clinical trials, so a substantial period of the patent term lapsed before FDA 
approval.  If the patent applicant filed a continuation or continuation-in-part 
application, the patent might issue later in time and thus expire later.62  But 
so long as the patent issued during the premarket program, some portion of 
its term would be sacrificed.  Under either patent scheme, the federal drug 
regulatory system leads to a shortened effective patent life. 
The distortion affects more than just the initial active ingredient patent.  
The final product comprises not only a particular active ingredient, but a 
particular formulation, route of administration, dosage form, and strength, as 
well as labeling that describes the indication and provides instructions for 
use.  These aspects of the product are typically worked out over the course 
of the premarket program.  As the finished product’s features take shape 
through new discoveries, the company seeks additional patent coverage.  
Whether it can file a new original patent application or must instead file a 
continuation or continuation-in-part will depend on the new discovery and 
the scope of the original patent disclosure.  But the distortion appears either 
way.  A new original patent will generally expire later than the initial active 
ingredient patent.  Before 1995, a continuation patent would have similarly 
 
 58  Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 348 (2007) (noting that applications for “composition of 
matter” patents are filed before clinical testing); Roin, supra note 57, at 539 (stating that 
pharmaceutical patents “are typically filed when drugs are in early preclinical research”). 
 59  Lietzan, Innovation Paradox, supra note 42, at 86. 
 60  Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669 (1990). 
 61  35 U.S.C. § 154 (2018). 
 62  A continuation application relies on the disclosure in an earlier filed (“parent”) 
application, but the scope of its claims is different. A continuation-in-part application 
similarly refers to the parent application but can add subject matter.  See U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP) 201.07–201.08 
(9th ed. 2018). 
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expired later, because the patent term lasted seventeen years from issuance.  
Today it will expire twenty years after the filing of its parent application.  In 
each case, though, some portion of the term lapses before the FDA permits 
the inventor to sell a product that includes the invention.  The regulatory 
system still distorts the patent. 
4. An Emergent Problem 
Distortion of drug patent terms emerged as a problem in the third 
quarter of the 20th century when an explosion in medical innovation and 
pharmaceutical patenting coincided with growth of the administrative state. 
The first modern medicines were launched in the early 1900s, with the 
discovery of insulin and the introduction of sulfa drugs, barbiturates, 
amphetamine, and heparin.63  By the late 1940s, there were applications in 
effect for penicillin drugs, morphine, phenobarbital, epinephrine, niacin, 
codeine, testosterone, progesterone, conjugated estrogens, digitalis, 
benzocaine, and theophylline, many of which are still viewed as essential 
today.64  But the big leap forward occurred when academic researchers began 
collaborating with the predecessors of today’s research based companies.65  
Companies introduced an average of forty-three new chemical entities per 
year in the 1950s.66  The FDA received applications for acetaminophen and 
new antibiotics, for example, as well as drugs to treat hypertension, 
anticoagulants, early cancer drugs, and the first oral contraceptive.67  Some 
call the 1950s the decade of the “miracle drug.”68 
The inventors of these drugs sought patent protection.  The medical and 
scientific establishments had opposed pharmaceutical patenting in the 19th 
century.69  In the early decades of the 20th century, though, academic 
 
 63  Suzanne Junod, FDA and Clinical Drug Trials: A Short History, in A QUICK GUIDE 
TO CLINICAL TRIALS (Madhu Davies & Faiz Kermani eds., 2008). 
 64  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EVER APPROVED DRUGS LIST [hereinafter EVER 
APPROVED DRUGS LIST] (obtained via Freedom of Information Act Request) (on file with 
author); see WHO Essential Medicines: 20th List, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/essentialmedicines/en/ (last updated Aug. 2017) 
 65  DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 118–22 (2010); Joseph M. Gabriel, 
Pharmaceutical Patenting and the Transformation of American Medical Ethics, 49 BRIT. J. 
HIST. SCI. 577, 587 (2016); Nicolas Rasmussen, The Drug Industry and Clinical Research in 
Interwar America: Three Types of Physician Collaborator, 79 BULL. HIST. MED. 50 (2005). 
 66  SAM PELTZMAN, REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: THE 1962 
AMENDMENTS 13 (1974). 
 67  EVER APPROVED DRUGS LIST, supra note 64. 
 68  E.g., HARRY M. MARKS, THE PROGRESS OF EXPERIMENT: SCIENCE AND THERAPEUTIC 
REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1990 149 (1997). 
 69  Gabriel, supra note 65, at 585, 587.  In the early 19th century, the orthodox medical 
community opposed patenting because it viewed commercialism as unseemly and because it 
equated patenting with secrecy, the province of quack medicines.  Id. at 578–82.  AMA 
LIETZAN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2018  1:51 PM 
2018] HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS 67 
researchers began to patent their discoveries, often assigning these patents to 
their host institutions or other institutions with which they affiliated.70  The 
domestic research-based companies also began to patent their discoveries.71  
The broader scientific and public health communities remained ambivalent 
about patenting medicines for several more decades.  But when the academic 
medical community and research-based pharmaceutical companies began to 
collaborate in earnest in the 1950s and 1960s, with “impressive therapeutic 
dividends” as Professor Gabriel put it, pharmaceutical patenting became 
viewed as “ethically legitimate and even necessary, as a part of the incentive 
structure that underlay the development of powerful new drugs.”72 
The administrative apparatus that truncates drug patent terms emerged 
at exactly the same time.  Premarket review of new drugs dates to 1938, but 
early applications were based on safety data and modest in size and scope.73  
Regulators and academic scientists developed the randomized, controlled, 
blinded clinical trial for proof of therapeutic claims in the 1940s.74  The FDA 
began routinely asking for outcomes data in the 1950s.75  In 1962, Congress 
enacted a premarket-approval requirement and required companies to 
provide substantial evidence of effectiveness, and the FDA’s expectations 
about the content and scope of applications grew more rigorous over the 
following decades.76  The average time from the first clinical trial to FDA 
approval increased threefold or fourfold, to around seven years, between 
1950 and 1965.77  The requirements for preclinical testing—which an 
 
prohibited holding patents and prescribing patented goods.  Id. at 580.  Early U.S. companies, 
such as Parke-Davis (now Pfizer) and E.R. Squibb (now Bristol-Myers Squibb), eschewed 
patents and trade secrets.  Id.  
 70  For example, the University of Toronto held the 1923 patent for insulin.  U.S. Patent 
No. 1,469,994 (filed Oct. 9, 1923). 
 71  Gabriel, supra note 65, at 587.  For instance, Parke-Davis (now Pfizer) owned at least 
eight patents issued in the 1920s directed to chemicals for medicinal use or methods of 
medical treatment.  E.g., U.S. Patent No. 1,717,198 (filed June 11, 1929) (claiming “[a]n 
immunizing product comprising washings from disease-producing microorganisms, said 
washings containing antigens specific to said organisms and being substantially free from said 
organisms and from specific bacterial toxins and specific bacterial proteins of said 
organisms”). 
 72  Gabriel, supra note 65, at 592–93. 
 73  Lietzan, Innovation Paradox, supra note 42, at 49–52 
 74  Geoffrey Marshall et al., Streptomycin Treatment of Pulmonary Tuberculosis: A 
Medical Research Council Investigation, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 769 (1948) (report of first such trial); 
Lietzan, Innovation Paradox, supra note 42, at 50–51. 
 75  21 Fed. Reg. 5576, 5578 (July 25, 1956) (promulgating 21 C.F.R. § 130.4, describing 
contents of application). 
 76  Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780; see Lietzan, Innovation 
Paradox, supra note 42, at 52–54. 
 77  Harold Clymer, The Changing Costs of Pharmaceutical Innovation (1965), reprinted 
in THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG INNOVATION (Cooper ed., 1970).  The Commissioner of Food 
and Drugs confirmed in early 1968 that new drugs averaged seven years from the beginning 
LIETZAN  (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2018  1:51 PM 
68 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:53 
inventor must complete before starting human trials—became more rigorous 
and time consuming in the same decades.78 
These developments distorted patent terms.  By the late 1960s, average 
effective patent life for new drugs had dropped to 13.9 years, and it dropped 
to 12.4 years by the early 1970s.79  By 1979, the average dropped to 9.5 
years.80  One study found that a quarter of the erosion in patent life was 
attributable to an increase in the time between patent filings and the start of 
clinical trials, when the inventor conducts preclinical testing.81  Half of the 
erosion was attributable to an increase in the time between the start of clinical 
trials and regulatory approval.82 
5. Scope of the Problem 
The new administrative state distorted patents in several fields of 
technology.  Since 1958, for instance, federal law has required premarket 
approval of food additives.83  A food additive petition must establish that the 
additive is safe and accomplishes its intended use.84  Generating these data 
and securing FDA approval can take six years or longer.85  Since 1960, color 
additives used in food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics have been subject to a 
similar preapproval requirement.86  The petition must contain chemical, 
toxicological, and environmental data,87 and the premarket timeline is 
comparable.88  Since 1962, a new animal drug has required an approved 
application showing safety and effectiveness for its labeled use.89  The 
 
of clinical trials until FDA approval.  Harold A. Clymer, The Changing Costs and Risks of 
Innovation in Drug Development, 13 RES. MGMT. 375, 381 (1970) (quoting James Goddard). 
 78  See infra note 227. 
 79  DAVID SCHWARTZMAN, INNOVATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 173 (1976). 
 80  Martin M. Eisman & William M. Wardell, The Decline in Effective Patent Life of New 
Drugs, 24 RES. MGMT. 18, 20 (1981); see also Peter Barton Hutt, The Importance of Patent 
Term Restoration to Pharmaceutical Innovation, 1 HEALTH AFFS. 6, 16–17 (1982) (discussing 
studies); Leonard G. Schifrin, Lessons from the Drug Lag: A Retrospective Analysis of the 
1962 Drug Regulations, 5 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91 (1982) (discussing studies). 
 81  Eisman & Wardell, supra note 80, at 20.  
 82  Id.  A final quarter was because the Patent Office issued patents faster.  Id. 
 83  Food Additive Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784 (1958). 
 84  21 U.S.C. §§ 348(b)(2), (c) (2012). 
 85  INST. OF MED., ENHANCING THE REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING APPROVAL PROCESS 
FOR DIRECT FOOD INGREDIENT TECHNOLOGIES: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 29, n.230 (1999). 
 86  Color Additive Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-618, 74 Stat. 397 (1960). 
 87  21 U.S.C. § 379e (2018); Andrew J. Zajac & Julie N. Barrows, FDA’s Regulation of 
Color Additives, FOOD SAFETY MAG., Oct./Nov. 2017, https://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/ 
magazine-archive1/octobernovember-2017/fdae28099 
s-regulation-of-color-additives/. 
 88  Brief for Procter & Gamble Co. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Eli Lilly & 
Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990) (No. 89-243), 1989 WL 1127523, at *2. 
 89  21 U.S.C. §§ 360b(a)(1), (b), (d) (2018). 
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research and development process averages 6.5 years for drugs intended for 
companion animals and 8.5 years for drugs intended for livestock.90  Since 
1976, higher-risk medical devices have required premarket approval from 
the FDA.91  The application must provide a reasonable assurance of the 
device’s safety and effectiveness, which generally requires data from clinical 
trials.92  The premarket process averages three to seven years from concept 
to market.93  Other regulators apply premarket testing and approval 
requirements to patented products.  Veterinary biologics—vaccines, 
diagnostic kits, and other products of biologic origin intended for veterinary 
use—require a license under the Virus, Serum, Toxin Act of 1913 issued by 
the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS).94  The applications 
contain safety and effectiveness data,95 which take an average of 5.5 years to 
generate.96  No one may market a pesticide without a license from the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), issued under the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.97  Applications contain data on 
product performance (effectiveness and usefulness) and potential risks to 
human health and the environment (safety).98  Testing, development, and 
registration of a new pesticide can take eight to ten years.99  Some new 
chemicals require premarket review by EPA under the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA).100 
 
 90  About Animal Medicines: Pharmaceuticals, ANIMAL HEALTH INST., 
https://www.ahi.org/about-animal-medicines/pharmaceuticals (last visited July 22, 2018). 
 91  Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976); 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360c(a)(1)(C) (defining class III devices), § 360e (requiring premarket approval of class III 
devices). 
 92  21 U.S.C. § 360e; 21 C.F.R. § 814.20 (2015). 
 93  Kyle M. Fargen et al., The FDA Approval Process for Medical Devices: An Inherently 
Flawed System or a Valuable Pathway for Innovation?, 5 J. NEUROINTERVENTIONAL SURGERY 
269, 270 (2013). 
 94  Pub. L. 430, 72 Stat. 832 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 151–158).  
 95  9 C.F.R. § 102.3 (2010); Veterinary Services Memorandum 800.50 (Feb. 9, 2011).  
 96  This number reflects the five veterinary biologics for which patent owners have sought 
patent term restoration under 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2018).  For each product, APHIS published 
the number of days in the “regulatory review period,” which began when it authorized 
preparation of an experimental veterinary biologic and ended when it issued a license.  See 68 
Fed. Reg. 17,335 (Apr. 9, 2003); 68 Fed. Reg. 24,705 (May 8, 2003); 72 Fed. Reg. 52,847 
(Sept. 17, 2007); 74 Fed. Reg. 37,000 (July 29, 2009); 82 Fed. Reg. 16,337 (Apr. 4, 2017).  
 97  7 U.S.C. § 136a (2018).  
 98  40 C.F.R. § 152.50; 40 C.F.R. § 152.80; see generally, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
PESTICIDE REGISTRATION MANUAL (2017), https://www.epa.gov/pesticideregistration/ 
pesticide-registration-manual. 
 99  The Pesticide Marketplace: Discovering and Developing New Products, PURDUE 
UNIVERSITY: PURDUE EXTENSION 10 (2006), https://www.extension.purdue.edu/extmedia/ 
PPP/PPP-71.pdf.  
 100  15 U.S.C. § 2604 (2018); David Markell, An Overview of TSCA, Its History and Key 
Underlying Assumptions, and its Place in Environmental Regulation, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 333, 353 (2010).  
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B. Policy Proposals to Address Patent Term Distortion 
The idea of restoring patents shortened by regulatory testing and 
premarket approval requirements emerged during the Carter Administration.  
When he took office in 1977, President Carter launched a “Domestic Policy 
Review of Industrial Innovation,” on the theory that increasing innovation 
would reduce inflation, create jobs, and improve the country’s trade 
position.101  The Secretary of Commerce chaired a Cabinet-level committee 
that coordinated the policy review and solicited the views of an advisory 
committee of outside experts.102  “More than 150 senior representatives from 
the industrial, public interest, labor, scientific, and academic communities” 
convened in subcommittees during the fall and winter of 1978 to consider 
the effect of the federal government on industrial innovation.103 Although 
industry dominated Carter’s Domestic Policy Review, pharmaceutical 
companies were not heavily involved.104 
After seven public symposia in January 1979, the subcommittees 
submitted final reports. Two subcommittees addressed patent life for 
regulated industries.105  First, a subcommittee considering environmental, 
health, and safety regulations voiced concern that new drugs with short 
expected patent life “cannot be developed economically” and “are not 
developed.”106  It proposed that drug patent terms start with drug approval.107  
A public interest subcommittee, staffed by executives from organizations 
such as the Consumer Protection Association, responded to the suggestion 
that regulations cause commercialization delays, but focused on EPA and 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations, 
suggesting that companies deluged these agencies with documents and bore 
some responsibility for the delay.108  Second, a subcommittee considering 
patent policy proposed patent extensions.109  This group, which did not limit 
its inquiry to drug patents or even regulated patentees, sought to “remedy” 
 
 101  U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ADVISORY COMM. ON INDUS. INNOVATION FINAL REP. iii 
(1979) [hereinafter CARTER REPORT]; see also CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, SCIENCE POLICY FROM 
FORD TO REAGAN: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 30 (1982) (noting that policymakers sought to 
“reindustrialize” the country to improve its economic performance).  
 102  CARTER REPORT, supra note 101, at ii–iii. 
 103  Id. at iii. 
 104  Senior executives from the industry filled the twenty-three positions on the 
environment, health, and safety subcommittee, but only four came from large drug companies.  
Id. at 37–38.  Only one of the fifteen members of the patent policy subcommittee came from 
the pharmaceutical industry.  Id. at 118–19. 
 105  Id. at 149, 157. 
 106  Id. at 59.  
 107  Id.  
 108  CARTER REPORT, supra note 101, at 87. 
 109  Id. at 157, 162.  
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the “inequity” of patent terms starting before commercialization.110  It 
proposed “compensation” equivalent to the “period of delay,” and 
“measured from the time an inventor has adequate evidence of commercial 
embodiment of the invention.”111  The public interest subcommittee 
responded by asking, somewhat rhetorically, whether the patent term should 
also be shortened when patent owners fail to commercialize.112  It again 
suggested that regulated patentees “fight” regulations and “deliver 
truckloads of documentation”—presumably also a reference to companies 
regulated by the EPA and OSHA—and argued that commercialization delays 
might increase if patents expired later.113 
Separately, after hearing from a broad array of stakeholders, including 
the FDA and academics, the National Research Council of the National 
Academies of Science (NAS) issued a report recommending that 
policymakers address truncated patent life.114  “Patent incentives,” it wrote 
in 1979, “might be employed to offset the negative impact on R&D 
incentives in highly innovative sectors like drugs and medical devices, which 
are also likely to be subject to particularly stringent forms of regulation over 
the foreseeable future.”115  The report suggested that patent life start “when 
regulatory approval is granted, thereby restoring the effective patent life to 
the nominal life of 17 years.”116 
III. HISTORY OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS 
Patent term extension was not a new idea.  More than 1000 patents had 
been extended over the course of U.S. history.117  Under the Patent Act of 
1836, for instance, a patent owner could obtain a seven-year extension of the 
fourteen-year patent term by showing that, without fault or negligence, he 
had failed to obtain “reasonable remuneration for the time, ingenuity, and 
expense” of developing the invention and “the introduction thereof into 
use.”118  After Congress eliminated the statutory extension authority in 1861, 
 
 110  Id. at 162.  
 111  Id.  
 112  Id. at 198.  
 113  Id. at 86–87, 198.  
 114  HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & JOHN M. VERNON, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., THE IMPACT OF 
REGULATION ON INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION vii–ix (1979). 
 115  Id. at 55.  
 116  Id.  
 117  Indeed, more than 1100 patents had been extended by 1874.  A complete list of 
extensions from 1790 to 1873 appears in 2 SUBJECT-MATTER INDEX OF PATENTS FOR 
INVENTIONS ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE FROM 1790 TO 1873, at 1912–25 
(Leggett, ed. 1874).  
 118  Act of July 4, 1836, 5 Stat. 124; see also Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas 
Jefferson Thought About Patents?  Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 
92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007) (discussing extensions under 1836 statute). 
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patent owners obtained extensions through private bills.119  Many sought 
private extensions on the ground that they had not received sufficient profit 
during the statutory term.120  The key House Committee decided in the 1870s 
that such an extension would be granted if the invention was valuable, the 
lack of adequate compensation stemmed from causes beyond the control of 
the inventor as well as a person of reasonable prudence and foresight, and 
the public would not be essentially injured.121  In other cases, a 1978 
congressional report explained that private relief was appropriate because 
the government had “a moral or ethical obligation toward the party.”122 
Rather than this private patent extension history, however, the patent 
policy subcommittee cited the handling of secrecy orders under the Invention 
Secrecy Act of 1951.123  Under this law, if disclosure of an invention might 
harm national security, the Commissioner of Patents must withhold the 
patent grant.124  Prosecution of the patent continues until the patent could 
issue, but the patent does not issue.125  Although an order lasts for one year, 
it can be renewed, and some last decades.126  Meanwhile, the government 
may use the invention.127  Once the government lifts the order and allows the 
patent to issue, the inventor receives the full patent term.  The inventor may 
also receive compensation for the government’s use of the invention and for 
“damage” caused by the secrecy order.128  Although the legislative history of 
 
 119  A private bill provides relief to a specific individual, corporation, or institution—
typically an exemption from, or modification of, otherwise-applicable law.  Congress also 
changed the patent term to seventeen years in 1861.  Patent Act of 1861, Pub. L. No. 36-42, 
12 Stat. 246.  
 120  CHRISTINE P. BENAGH, CRS. HISTORY OF PRIV. PAT. LEGIS. H.R. 10 (1978), reprinted 
in Private Patent Legislation: Hearing on H. R. 2882 before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 104–05 
(1984) [hereinafter PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION]. 
 121  H.R. REP. NO. 45-177 (1879). 
 122  PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION, supra note 120.  The report cited extension of U.S. 
Patent. No. 19,023 in December 1944 as a “classic example.”  Id.  This patent had been found 
invalid by a judge later convicted of taking payment for the verdict in question.  Id.  See 
generally Priv. L. No. 554, 58 Stat. 1095 (1944); United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d 
Cir. 1939).   
 123  CARTER REPORT, supra note 101, at 157. 
 124  35 U.S.C. § 181 (2018).   
 125  35 U.S.C. § 181.  
 126  35 U.S.C. § 181; e.g., Stein v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 2d 265, 266 (D. Mass. 2001) 
(noting secrecy order from April 1973 to March, 2000,); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 
685 F.2d 1361, 1362 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (noting secrecy order from May 1949 to June 1975). 
 127  35 U.S.C. § 183 (2018). 
 128  35 U.S.C. § 183.  Damage might include loss in market value because of the time 
shifting (for instance, because the technology became obsolete).  Compensation is rare in 
practice.  See Cynthia M. Ho, Inoculation Inventions: The Interplay of Infringement and 
Immunity in the Development of Biodefense Vaccines, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 111, 138 
(2005). 
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the 1951 statute is thin,129 courts generally characterize the goal as 
compensatory.130  In theory, the statute restores the inventor to the position 
he would have occupied without the government’s intervention. 
The more analogous precedents might have been the statutes governing 
restoration of patents issued to soldiers.  Under the World War I Patent 
Extension Act, any patent holder who served honorably in the military 
between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918, was eligible for a patent 
extension of three times his length of service.131  The House Committee on 
Patents explained that the goal was to “extend the monopoly given to these 
men, if by reason of the fact that they were taken into service, they lost the 
income that they would otherwise have received, or if that income was 
reduced during the time spent in the military service.”132  These men were 
“entitled” to an extension, and an extension of three times the length of 
service would be “equitable and just.”133  Supporters of the legislation 
 
 129  The formal history comprises one published hearing with two witnesses, a brief House 
report, and a Senate report reprinting the House report.  Patent Disclosure: Hearings Before 
Subcomm. 3 on H.R. 4687, Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. (1951); H.R. REP. NO. 82-
1028 (1951); S. REP. NO. 82-1001 (1951).  This legislation replaced predecessor legislation 
with similarly thin history.  Under a 1917 statute, the government could impose a secrecy 
order that would last throughout World War I.  Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 95, 40 Stat. 394.  
During World War II but before the United States entered the war, Congress amended the 
statute to authorize secrecy orders lasting as long as national interest required, but the statute 
itself would expire in two years.  Act of July 1, 1940, ch. 501, 54 Stat. 710.  After the United 
States entered the war, Congress changed the language back, so that secrecy orders would last 
through the war.  Act of June 16, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-415, 56 Stat. 370.  Congress passed a 
permanent law in 1951 because earlier orders remained in place, the government had imposed 
additional orders, and the Korean War had started.  Pub. L. No. 82-256, 66 Stat. 3 (1952); see 
generally H.R. REP. NO. 96-1540, at 33–62 (1980) (recounting history of invention secrecy). 
 130  E.g., Linick v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 319, 320 (2012), aff’d, 515 F. App’x 892 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (mem.) (stating that Section 183 grants “a patent owner the right to seek ‘just 
compensation’ for damage caused by a secrecy order”); Constant v. United States, 223 Ct. Cl. 
148, 155 (1980) (stating that overall purpose of Section 183 “seems to be to provide a 
comprehensive scheme for compensation to patent owners proving damages due to the 
issuance of a secrecy order”)).  
 131  Act of May 31, 1928, ch. 992, § 1, 45 Stat. 1012 (1928). 
 132  H.R. REP. NO. 70-1314, at 2 (1928) (“When war was declared in April, 1917, and the 
conscription act was passed, all able-bodied men were called to the colors, including men who 
were the holders of patents; and it has developed that a few of them, at least had started to 
build organizations for the development of the invention on which a patent had issued, but the 
call to war caused a necessary abandonment of such organization, and the invention and 
development were left at a standstill while the men were in service.”). 
 133  Id.; S. REP. NO. 70-1339, at 1 (1928) (containing identical language); see also 
Extension of Time Limitations On Certain Patents: Hearing on S. 4927 Before the S. Comm. 
on Patents, 69th Cong. 21 (1927) (hearing on an earlier version of the legislation) (“[T]he 
sovereign has the duty to perform those things which will inspire in the breasts of citizens the 
patriotism which it wants there and it has, in order to inspire that patriotism, always, from the 
first beginning of the history of states, the sovereign has rewarded service rendered and has 
always taken steps to see that the service rendered would not work an injustice to those who 
rendered the service.”) (statement of Senator Stewart); id. (“[T]he Government, as a sovereign 
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sometimes spoke of honoring a “contract” between the government and 
patent owners, but the thrust was that the government had chosen a different 
social goal and would make things right for the patent owners.134 
The World War II Patent Extension Act was similarly meant “to 
provide for an extension of the life of patents issued to veterans of World 
War II, on the theory that their service would have in many cases precluded 
them an opportunity to exploit their patents during that period.”135 Removal 
from their occupations “effectively deprived them off their freedom to 
exploit their patent rights.”136  The extension for the second World War was 
limited to twice the veteran’s length of service.137 
A. Patent Term Restoration 
In April 1979, Representative Steven Symms (R-ID) introduced a two-
page bill adopting the approach proposed by President Carter’s health and 
safety subcommittee.138  The term of any patent issued for a new drug or 
animal drug would begin on the date of patent issuance but end on the earlier 
of either (a) seventeen years after drug approval or (b) twenty-seven years 
after patent issuance.139  As a practical matter, the twenty-seven-year rule 
would cabin the patent term only if the patent issued more than ten years 
before drug approval.  Otherwise, the seventeen-year rule would be the 
operative limit, and drug patent owners would enjoy the full seventeen years.  
The proposal can be analogized somewhat to the secrecy order framework.  
Like regulatory premarket requirements, a secrecy order precludes 
 
power, with all its ancient rights and justice and mercy will not permit an injury to be done”).  
 134  E.g., Extension of Time Limitations On Certain Patents: Hearing on S. 4927 Before 
the S. Comm. on Patents, 69th Cong. 2 (1927) (statement of Arthur Rathjen, witness) (“[T]his 
legislation . . . is for the purpose of curing an inequity resulting from the fact that the United 
States Government violated a contractual relation with a certain class of citizens; that is, men 
who were drafted into the service of the United States”); id. (“We have not treated you just 
right.  We made a contract with you.  We did not keep it.  We had something more important 
to do.  We put you to doing something which we thought was of a great deal more importance.  
You could not develop your patent.  And besides, your income was affected by it.  We put 
you in the Army and you could not do it.  But, we will keep our faith with you.  We will keep 
our part of the contract.”).  
 135  H.R. REP. NO. 81-1214, at 33 (1949); see Act of June 30, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-598, 
64 Stat. 316. 
 136  § 1, 64 Stat. 316. 
 137  Id. 
 138  H.R. 3589, 96th Cong. (1979). Rep. Harold Sawyer (R-MI) had introduced similar 
language during a markup of legislation that became the Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 
94 Stat. 3015 (1980).  He withdrew the amendment “with the understanding that the matter 
would be taken up in the 97th Congress after an opportunity for thorough education and 
study.”  COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1982, H.R REP. NO. 
97-696, at 6 (1982).  
 139  This bill was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary, and Congress took no 
further action.  
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commercialization of an invention.140  After the PTO lifts the secrecy order, 
the patent lasts for a normal term.  Giving regulated products seventeen years 
of effective patent life has the same effect.  In both cases the patent is time-
shifted but enjoyed in full. 
The Symms bill launched a five-and-a-half-year-legislative process 
considering patent term restoration for regulated patent owners.  It was, 
however, the only bill to specify a fixed term that would, by default, apply 
equally to all drug patents, as well as the only one that overtly aimed for a 
seventeen-year effective patent life.  The Kastenmeier proposals, introduced 
in 1980 and 1981, instead took the approach urged by the patent policy 
subcommittee of tailoring the restoration to the time lost by each patentee, 
as the veteran statutes had done.141 
1. The Kastenmeier Proposals 
The Kastenmeier proposals applied to any product subjected to federal 
premarket regulatory review, including new drugs, new animal drugs, food 
additives, color additives, human and veterinary biological products, 
pesticides, and chemicals regulated under TSCA.  Any patent covering such 
a product or a method of using such a product would be extended by an 
amount of time equal to the product’s “regulatory review period.”142  The 
patent owner could recover only the portion of the regulatory review period 
after patent issuance, which meant that effective patent life could not exceed 
the statutory seventeen-year term.143  These bills also limited the number of 
days the patent owner could recover; no extension could exceed seven 
years.144  The drafters based this on the length of the average clinical testing 
program and application review period for new drugs.145  The seven-year cap 
meant that if a particular product’s premarket program took longer than the 
average program for new drugs, the patent owner would lose those patent 
 
 140  35 U.S.C. § 186 (2018) (Disclosure of the invention—including through commercial 
sales—is a federal crime). 
 141  Sen. Birch Bayh (D-IN) and Rep. Robert Kastenmeier (D-WI) introduced these bills 
in 1980. Patent Term Restoration Act of 1980, S. 2892, 96th Cong. (1980); Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1980, H.R. 7952, 96th Cong. (1980).  The bills were referred to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and the House Committee on the Judiciary, respectively, and Congress 
took no further action.  Sen. Charles Mathias (R-MD) and Rep. Kastenmeier re-introduced 
the bills in 1981.  S. 255, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 1937, 97th Cong. (1981).  
 142  A new drug “regulatory review period” lasted from the date the company asked 
permission to start clinical trials until the date the FDA permitted commercial sales.  E.g., S. 
2892, 96th Cong. § 155(c)(4) (1980). 
 143  E.g., S. 2892, 96th Cong. §§ 155(c)(4), 155(a) (1980). 
 144  E.g., S. 255, 97th Cong. § 155(a)(2) (1981). 
 145  Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 528.  Both the industry and FDA had shown that 
the time from the start of clinical trials to FDA approval averaged seven years in the late 
1960s.  See supra note 77.  The legislative history does not explain why Kastenmeier capped 
restoration at the average experience. 
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years.  Regardless of the cap, however, if a patent issued in the final seven 
years before the product received marketing approval, the inventor would 
enjoy seventeen years of patent life. 
The Kastenmeier proposals borrowed more from the veteran statutes 
than from the secrecy order framework.  The veteran statutes added years to 
the end of an already-issued patent, because the patentee had been unable to 
commercialize the patent due to participation in the war effort.146  Patent-
term restoration for regulated products would similarly add years to an 
already-issued patent and similarly because the patent owner could not 
commercialize the patent because of a federally-imposed obligation to 
perform tasks advancing different national priorities. 
There are, however, distinctions.  First, no federal law precluded the 
veteran from commercializing the patent during his service, which means 
that some may have enjoyed passive revenue during the war and still 
benefited from restoration.  Although a regulated patent owner might receive 
royalties on its patent during the premarket period, this income would be 
modest because any licensee would be similarly unable to commercialize the 
invention.  Second, veterans received two or three times the number of days 
lost to service in the war.147  The legislative history does not explain the 
decision to multiply the days, but it may reflect the value placed on military 
service and the moral standing of veterans at the time.  Or it may reflect an 
assumption that veterans lost more momentum in development of their 
inventions than just days of actual service.  But it meant that a veteran’s 
ultimate effective patent life—even excluding passive life during the war—
could be more than the effective life enjoyed by others. 
2. Bipartisan Support and Passage in the Senate 
Throughout the policy-making process, supporters of patent-term 
restoration identified two rationales for acting.  First, patent-term restoration 
would repair the incentive to innovate in regulated sectors of the economy.148  
Second, restoration would compensate the patent owner for the portion of the 
patent right sacrificed because of public policy objectives embedded in a 
 
 146  Some patent owners participated voluntarily; others did not.  EXTENSION OF PATENTS 
HELD BY VETERANS OF WORLD WAR II, H.R. REP. NO. 81-124, at 34 (1949). 
 147  The drafters of the World War I statute had proposed that all veterans receive seven 
years, but the bill evolved to tie each veteran’s restoration to his days of service.  E.g., Patents 
of World War Soldiers: Hearings Held Before the Comm. on Patents of the H.R., 90th Cong. 
44 (1928). 
 148  E.g., Health and the Env’t Misc.—Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health 
and the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 305 (1981)  (statement of 
Lewis Engman, President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) (discussing 
“substantial consumer benefits from the innovations which will be encouraged by patent term 
restoration”). 
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statute administered by another part of the government.149  Some cast this in 
terms of preventing discrimination or inequity; regulated inventors should 
not be disadvantaged with shorter effective patent life than other inventors.150 
Drug patent owners bolstered the case for restoration with empirical 
studies finding a decline in the rate of new drug introductions over the years 
when the effective patent life had grown shorter.151  The most influential 
study was Professor Peltzman’s 1974 paper connecting the decline to the 
1962 amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 
which had introduced the formal requirement to provide substantial evidence 
of effectiveness.152  Peltzman found that the number of new chemical entities 
dropped from an average of forty-three each year in the decade before the 
1962 amendments to an average of sixteen after the amendments.153  
Working from different data sources, Professor Grabowski reported in 1976 
that the average annual rate of new chemical entity introductions had 
dropped from fifty-six (between 1950 and 1961) to around seventeen after 
the 1962 law.154  FDA leadership at first questioned the reports but soon 
confirmed a “declining number of new single entity drugs approved” in the 
United States.155  By the late 1970s and early 1980s, when policymakers 
 
 149  COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1981, S. REP. NO. 
97-138, at 1 (1981) (“S. 255 would remedy this unintended and inequitable side effect by 
restoring to the term of the patent the time lost in complying with the government’s premarket 
testing and review requirements”); The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th 
Cong. 15 (1983) (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.) (“I am a cosponsor of S. 
1306, . . . because it . . . will restore the intent of the patent law to protect, for a set period of 
time, the rights of a creator [in] the fruits of his labor. . . .  Instead of having 17 years in which 
to recover its investment, like firms in virtually all other industries, patent life is cut 
substantially, almost in half.”). 
 150  E.g., The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 61 (1981) (statement of Arthur Smith, General Counsel for the 
Office of Sponsored Programs at MIT) (“[T]here has evolved a pattern which, in practice, 
discriminates against one class of patentholders by insuring that they will not receive the 
benefits of the full 17-year patent life which is available to other patentholders”); S. REP. NO. 
97-138, at 28 (statement of Gerald Mossinghoff, Acting Deputy Secretary of Commerce) 
(“The inequity to certain sectors of our industry, whose inventions are denied a full patent 
term due to Federal premarketing approval requirements, has been widely recognized.”). 
 151  E.g., Health and the Env’t Misc.—Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health 
and the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 353–67 (1981) (statement 
of Lewis Engman). 
 152  PELTZMAN, supra note 66, at 13–16. 
 153  Id. at 13.  Peltzman focused on the rate of new chemical entity introductions rather 
than the rate of application submissions.  This is common in empirical accounts of innovation.  
The FDA approves most new chemical entity applications; attrition typically occurs before a 
company submits its marketing application, for instance because of failure in phase 2 or phase 
3 trials.  Lietzan, Innovation Paradox, supra note 42, at 78–79. 
 154  HENRY GRABOWSKI, DRUG REGULATION AND INNOVATION: EMPIRAL EVIDENCE AND 
POLICY OPTIONS 17–18 (1976). 
 155  Compare Henry Grabowski, John Vernon, & Lacy Thomas, Estimating the Effects of 
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were considering the effective patent life problem, a substantial body of 
empirical literature verified the decline.156 
Professor Peltzman’s analysis showed that the new regulatory regime 
had reduced the annual flow of new drugs by about sixty percent.157  The 
Commissioner of Food and Drugs suggested in 1978 that this reflected 
rejection of ineffective drugs that would have reached the market under the 
pre-1962 law.158  Efficacy had always been a part of premarket review, 
however, even when it was not a formal statutory requirement.159  And 
Peltzman found that the 1962 amendments had little impact on the incidence 
of ineffective drugs in the market.160  He concluded that the marketplace 
before 1962 had imposed adequate penalties on sellers of ineffective 
drugs.161  Professor Wiggins brought the data forward in 1981, finding that 
regulation had reduced new drug introduction rates in the 1970s by roughly 
sixty percent.162 
Some economists criticized Peltzman’s work—for instance, because he 
failed to account for a downward trend in innovation in the late 1950s,163 or 
because his model did not include supply-side factors relating to the 
 
Regulation on Innovation: An International Comparative Analysis of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 21 J.L. & ECON. 133, 137 (1978) (quoting 1974 speech of Commissioner Schmidt 
that “[t]he rate of development and marketing of truly important, significant, and unique 
therapeutic entities in this country has remained relatively stable for the past 22 years”), with 
Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1973-74, Part 1: Hearings on S. 3441 and S. 
966 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93rd Cong., 
272 (1973-74) [hereinafter Examination of Industry] (statement of Comm’r Schmidt) (noting 
“declining number of new single entity drugs approved in the U.S.” and other countries). 
 156  E.g., Leonard G. Schifrin & Jack R. Tayan, The Drug Lag: An Interpretive Review of 
the Literature, 7 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVS. 359, 371 (1977) (reviewing evidence, finding “a 
considerable possibility that a drug lag exists,” and noting that “both economic and medical 
analyses indicate that by delaying, occasionally for long periods, the availability of most new 
drugs, we have also denied their benefits to patients”). 
 157  PELTZMAN, supra note 66, at 19. 
 158  Donald Kennedy, A Calm Look at the “Drug Lag,” 239 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 423, 425 
(1978) (noting that better understanding of pharmacokinetics, analytical toxicology, and the 
need to test for carcinogenic, mutagenic, and teratogenic effects leads to more extensive and 
longer-term safety testing before market approval, which results in a longer premarket 
program and some drug rejections). 
 159  Lietzan, Innovation Paradox, supra note 42, at 49–50. 
 160  PELTZMAN, supra note 66, at 45, 48.  
 161  Id. at 48.  In his view, the primary benefit of the 1962 law derived from the fact that 
mandatory premarket testing revealed a drug’s toxic effects before market entry.  Id. at 31.  
Previously drug companies had borne a small proportion of the consumer cost for unusually 
harmful drugs, leading to over-production of those drugs.  Id. at 52. 
 162  Steven N. Wiggins, Product Quality Regulation and New Drug Introductions: Some 
Evidence from the 1970s, 63 REV. ECON. & STAT. 615, 617, 619 (1981).  A literature review 
in the early 1980s reached the same conclusion. JOHN W. EGAN ET AL., ECONOMICS OF THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 133 (1982). 
 163  E.g., Schifrin, supra note 80, at 94.  
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depletion of scientific knowledge.164  For instance, the FDA contended that 
researchers had already identified many important therapeutic agents; the 
“gaps” in knowledge had thus decreased and further “opportunities” had 
declined.165  In the late 1970s Professor Grabowski investigated the role of 
research depletion empirically, comparing new drug innovation in the United 
States with new drug innovation in the United Kingdom.  This study 
confirmed that depletion of opportunities played a role but also found that 
U.S. regulatory requirements played a significant role.166 
Supporters of patent term restoration attributed the decline in 
innovation to the increased time and cost to market that resulted from 
evolution in the premarket paradigm.  In other words, the additional testing 
requirements increased the cost of bringing an invention to market and 
delayed commercialization, and the delay shortened the effective patent life 
during which the inventor could recover the now-increased investment.  A 
Merck executive explained this in April 1981.  The patent is the 
“predominant incentive” for pharmaceutical research and development.”167  
Indeed, “[t]he research budget authorized by Merck’s Board of Directors is 
directly related to the rewards dependent upon our patent system.”168  The 
company was “becoming much more sensitive to the years likely to remain 
on the patent when a candidate for development is finally ready to be 
marketed.”169  Thus, if all other considerations were equal, “a development 
candidate which may take an inordinate amount of development time, with 
a resultant loss of effective patent life, is going to be less attractive than one 
with a shorter projected development period.”170  At Merck, “[a] patent term 
that is reduced by seven or more years is not a sufficiently strong investment 
 
 164  E.g., GRABOWSKI, DRUG REGULATION, supra note 154, at 28. 
 165  Examination of Industry, supra note 155, at 272; see also Kennedy, supra note 158, at 
424 (arguing that the “wave of miracle drugs” in the 1940s and 1950s was not followed by a 
second wave “comprising drugs that can treat with the same degree of effectiveness” 
conditions such as cancer, arthritis, and cardiovascular disease, perhaps because of an 
“apparent exhaustion of certain basic knowledge in which the industry’s earlier breakthroughs 
were based”). 
 166  Grabowski, Vernon, & Thomas, supra note 155.  The authors found a significant 
decline in the number of new chemical entities discovered and introduced (per effective 
research and development dollar) in both countries after 1962, suggesting at least some 
decline in the United States stemmed from factors other than U.S. regulatory requirements.  
But it also found a six-fold productivity decline in the United States, compared to a three-fold 
decline in the United Kingdom, between 1960 to 1961, and 1966 to 1970.  A regression 
analysis showed that U.S. regulatory requirements had a statistically significant and 
quantitatively important effect. 
 167  Health and the Env’t Misc.—Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and 
the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 321 (1981) (statement of Dr. 
Lewis H. Sarett).  
 168  Id. at 322.  
 169  Id. 
 170  Id. at 322–23.  
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incentive for a management concerned about the increasing costs of 
R&D.”171  In response to a question from Representative Thomas J. Bliley 
(R-VA), the witness identified research programs Merck had dropped 
because of shortened effective patent life: treatments for cystic fibrosis, 
myasthenia gravis, and emphysema.172 
The push for patent term restoration drew support from the new Reagan 
Administration and research universities.  The Reagan transition team’s 
Health Policy Advisory Group endorsed patent term restoration for new 
drugs in November 1980.173  After Reagan took office in January 1981, his 
Secretary of Commerce established an intellectual property committee, 
chaired by the new Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Gerald 
Mossinghoff, which similarly urged patent term restoration.174  The General 
Accounting Office (GAO) took a similar position, reporting in 1981 that the 
average effective patent life for new drugs was roughly ten years, and that 
these drugs needed twelve to nineteen years to break even and earn a 
competitive return on capital.175  Research and development expenditures in 
the pharmaceutical industry are sensitive to expected returns and cash flow, 
it added, and patent term restoration would have “positive impacts on 
both.”176  At hearings, university witnesses added that patent term restoration 
would benefit university patent holders, who need to attract industrial 
licensees to transfer technology invented on campuses.177  Throughout the 
legislative process, supporters also had a powerful ally in the FDA.178  As far 
 
 171  Id. at 323.  
 172  Id. at 340; see also Lewis H. Sarett, FDA Regulations and Their Influence on Future 
R&D, 17 RES. MGMT. 18 (1974). 
 173  Memorandum to William J. Casey et al., Report of the Chairman of the Health Policy 
Advisory Group to President-elect Ronald Reagan (Nov. 14, 1980), William J. Casey Papers, 
Box 299, Folder 11, Hoover Institution Archives, at 17 (“It is apparent that under existing 
legislation and regulation new drug research has diminished drastically within our own 
country.  Legislation is needed . . . to . . . [e]xtend the patent life of pharmaceuticals to match 
the time lost in delays involved in obtaining FDA marketing approval.”); see also Marilou 
Sturges, Cut! Chop! Energize!, 1 PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE 21 (1981); Morton Mintz, 
Laxalt, Reagan Advisers Differ on Drug Cost Plan, WASH. POST. (Dec. 1, 1980), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/12/01/laxalt-reagan-advisers-differ-
on-drug-cost-plan/203bc473-8a68-4db3-865c-
838be1f0b285/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ad7e9eb111e1 
 174  Mossinghoff, supra note 24, at 188. 
 175  GEN. ACCT. OFF., REPORT TO SENATOR MATHIAS (1981), as reprinted in COMM. ON 
THE JUDICIARY, THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1981, S. REP. NO. 97-138, at 11 
(1981). 
 176  Id. 
 177  The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 61–67 (1981) (statements of Arthur Smith, MIT, and Edwin Yates, 
Johns Hopkins University). 
 178  Health and the Env’t Misc.—Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and 
the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 343 (1981)  (statement of 
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as the agency was concerned, “innovators typically lose years of patent 
exclusivity because of testing requirements and regulatory review.”179  
Concerned about “the paradox that the careful and time-consuming scientific 
review needed to confirm safety and effectiveness may be reducing 
incentives to develop drugs that come to [the] FDA for review,”180 the 
agency supported patent term restoration “as a means of encouraging 
research.”181 
Following an April 1981 hearing at which supporters made the case for 
restoration, the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably reported the 
Kastenmeier bill.  “The patent has traditionally served as a major incentive 
for innovation,” it stated in its report.182  The patent “provides an incentive 
for the costly and lengthy work of developing an invention by giving the 
inventor a sufficient opportunity to market a new product exclusively.”183  
Congress had “selected 17 years as the period which best fulfilled this 
objective.”184  The “substantial erosion of the patent term for products 
subject to extensive Federal premarketing testing, notification, and review 
requirements,” however, “raises the serious question of whether the patent 
term continues to play its traditional role of encouraging innovation for these 
products.”185  Firms “cannot commit funds to initiate long-term research 
projects unless they have reasonable assurances that money will continue to 
be available to pay for those projects in later years.”186  Restoration would 
benefit downstream competitors; “successful measures to stimulate greater 
development and marketing of valuable new drugs will ultimately rebound 
to the benefit of companies who bring low-cost generic versions to the public 
by enlarging the stream of innovation they exploit.”187 
 
 
 
Richard Crout, Director, Bureau of Drugs) (agreeing that there had been “an erosion of the 
patent life” for regulatory reasons, and he would “favor” a “solution to the problem,” because 
“drugs are valuable commodities” and society needs “the right economic incentives for 
research on them”); see also The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing 
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 2 (1981) (noting that Secretary Schweiker had 
endorsed the objectives of the patent term restoration bill). 
 179  Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Hearing on S.2748 
Before the Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 98th Cong. 18 (1984) (statement of Mark 
Novitch, Acting Comm’r of Food & Drugs). 
 180  Id. 
 181  Id. at 19. 
 182  S. REP. NO. 97-138, at 6 (1981). 
 183  Id.  
 184  Id. 
 185  Id. 
 186  Id. at 7. 
 187  Id. at 9. 
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Although incentive arguments dominated the policy discussion, 
arguments about the “fairness” of providing compensation and the need to 
ensure equal outcomes for all inventors also gave the Kastenmeier proposal 
momentum.  The Assistant Commissioner of Patents argued that there was 
“absolutely no reason” why pharmaceutical companies and other companies 
subject to premarket requirements “should receive patents with a shorter 
effective patent life than is available to other industries.”188  These 
sentiments informed legislative support at this stage as well.  Representative 
Waxman commented, for instance, that “seventeen years is . . . the amount 
of time we say it is fair to have exclusive rights as the result of research and 
development not only in drugs but in all other areas.”189  The Senate Judiciary 
Committee report commented that “[t]here is no valid reason for a better 
mousetrap to receive 17 years of patent protection and a lifesaving drug less 
than ten years.”190  Patent term restoration would “remedy” a “simple but 
serious inequity in the patent system.”191 
Support for the Kastenmeier proposals on both grounds was bipartisan 
in Congress, and the major newspapers endorsed restoration, citing both 
rationales.192  Even the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) 
agreed.193  The Senate passed the Kastenmeier bill in July 1981 and referred 
the proposal to the House Committee on the Judiciary, which was already 
reviewing the companion bill in the House.  A subcommittee of the House 
 
 188  The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 37 (1981) (statement of Rene D. Tegtmeyer, Acting Comm’r of Patents 
and Trademarks). 
 189  Health and the Env’t Misc.—Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and 
the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 368 (1981). 
 190  COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1981, S. REP. NO. 
97-138, at 2 (1981). 
 191  Id. at 1. 
 192  Extending Patents on New Drugs, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 15, 1982 (“[A]rguments by 
consumer groups fail to take into account a number of important points . . . .  Consumers—
and taxpayers who now pay such a big portion of medical bills—will benefit enormously from 
the development of new medications.  Extending the life of patents will encourage drug 
companies to invest more in research and make more effective new medications possible.”); 
Long Life to Patents, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1981 (“There is a simple way to help restore R&D 
incentive to the drug industry: guarantee the full 17-year protection by starting the patent 
clock ticking after FDA approval, not before.”); Patently Fair, WASH. POST., May 20, 1981 
(“But there are strong[] arguments in favor of patent life assurance.  One is simple fairness.  
If 17 years is the right period for protecting the exclusive rights of inventors, there is no reason 
why those subject to federal regulation should be denied it solely by reason of that 
regulation.”); The Half-Life Patents, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1981 (“The system discriminates 
unfairly against some of the most important research-based industries.”). 
 193  E.g., The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 291–92 (1981) (statement of the National Retired Teachers 
Association and the American Association of Retired Persons) (“We therefore can support S. 
255’s restoration of the patent grant for the period of time—not to exceed seven years—that 
nonpatent regulatory requirements prevent the marketing of a potential product.”). 
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Judiciary Committee considered both bills through the fall and early winter 
of 1981. 
3. Emergence of Opposition in the Winter of 1981-1982 
Opposition to patent term restoration grew over the winter of 1981, 
fueled by the generic drug industry’s new lobbying group, the Generic 
Pharmaceutical Industry Association (GPIA) and supported by its allies in 
the private and public sectors.194  In the legislature, the generic companies 
had strong support from Representatives Waxman and Gore (D-TN), as well 
as Senator Metzenbaum (D-OH), among others.  Chief among the private 
sector allies was Public Citizen, with supporting roles played by labor and 
groups representing senior citizens.  Ralph Nader had founded Public Citizen 
in 1971 with the mission of protecting health, safety, and democracy.  Sidney 
Wolfe had joined Public Citizen the same year and directed the Health 
Research Group, devoted to pressing for health-related legal reforms.  Public 
Citizen, and Sidney Wolfe in particular, were deeply engaged in the battle 
against patent term restoration from the earliest days. 
Opponents of patent term restoration made a variety of arguments at 
this stage, most of which they continued to make until enactment of the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments in the fall of 1984.  William Schultz, speaking 
on behalf of Public Citizen, argued from the very beginning that effective 
patent life should be shorter, rather than longer.195  Others were more 
temperate, conceding the incentive role of the patent but questioning the 
economic justification put forward for restoration.196  The AARP commented 
in 1981 that the “equity argument” was “reasonable” and “warrants 
consideration,” but it was not “as convinced by the arguments based on 
economic disincentives.”197  The generic industry, in particular, questioned 
the empirical support for the proposals.  William Haddad, then a member of 
the board of the newly formed Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association, 
told Congress “we favor patent protection, but the case has yet to be made 
 
 194  Judee Shuler, Bill Haddad, 6 PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE 24, 27 (1986) (“The fight 
solidified GPIA.”)  
 195  The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 402–05 (1981) (statements of William B. Schultz, Attorney, Public 
Citizens Litigation Group, Accompanied by Benjamin Gordon, Staff Economist; and Fred 
Wegner, Pharmaceutical Specialist, American Association of Retired Persons and National 
Retired Teachers Association). 
 196  E.g., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1981, S. 
REP. NO. 97-138, at 63 (1981) (statement of William Haddad, President, GPIA) (“Research 
has not declined; innovation has not declined; patent life has not been cut in half.”).   
 197   The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 418 (1981) (statement of Fred Wegner, Pharmaceutical Specialist, 
Specialist, American Association of Retired Persons and National Retired Teachers 
Association). 
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that the industry is not getting this protection.”198  If the innovators “make 
their case that delay requires additional patent life, [then] they should have 
additional life, but to date they have not made their case.”199  The 
association’s outside counsel questioned the relevance of declining effective 
patent life, arguing that it did not correspond with declining exclusivity in 
the market.200  The association argued that “actual average exclusive market 
life” for the 100 most widely used drugs ranged from sixteen to 18.5 years, 
largely because of patents on the product and method of use.201 
This is an important point, but it needs historical context.  Once the 
compound patent expired, a generic firm could market the compound.  
Nothing required it to pursue the same route of administration, dosage form, 
strength, or use.202  And nothing required it to use the same manufacturing 
process.  While many newer drugs may have enjoyed sixteen to eighteen and 
a half years on the market before another company introduced the same 
active ingredient in a competing product, this generally reflected business 
decisions made by individual generic companies.  In part, this may have been 
because the applications were expensive to prepare.  At the time, generic 
companies had to file the same kind of application as innovators filed.203  
That is, generic companies filed full new drug applications (“NDAs”), with 
the results of their own clinical trials, which cost millions of dollars to 
prepare.  At least 100 newer drugs were off patent and lacked generic 
competition simply because generic companies would not invest in full 
clinical programs.204 
 
 
 198  The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 434 (1981) (statement of William Haddad).   
 199   Id.  See also Drug Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and 
H.R. 1097 Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 98th Cong. 51 (1983) (statement of Haddad) (“[I]f patent life has been retarded 
by Government regulations, it should be restored,” but the patent owners have not provided 
information to “prove” that case). 
 200  Alfred Engelberg, Patent Term Extension: An Overreaching Solution to a Nonexistent 
Problem, 1 HEALTH AFFS. 34, 41 (1982). 
 201  Drug Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and H.R. 1097 Before 
the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 49 
(1983) (statement of Kenneth Larsen, chair, GPIA); see also Innovation and Patent Law 
Reform: Hearings on H.R. 3285, H.R. 3286 and H.R. 3605 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 413, 420 
(1984) [hereinafter Innovation and Patent Law Reform]. 
 202  It might prefer to introduce an identical copy, however, to take advantage of the new 
automatic substitution laws.  These had not been enacted in every state.  Henry Grabowski & 
John Vernon, Substitution Laws and Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 43 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (1979). 
 203  See infra Section III.B. 
 204  Mossinghoff, supra note 24, at 187. 
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Opponents of patent term restoration also questioned the connection 
between federal regulation and declining effective patent life, suggesting that 
drug firms would perform the research anyway.  For instance, Senators 
Theodore Kennedy (D-MA) and Metzenbaum commented in 1981 that 
manufacturers “by their own admission engage in substantial testing of 
safety and efficacy to protect themselves against product liability and 
consumer fraud suits.”205  Alfred Engelberg, who represented the generic 
industry association in the legislative process, added in an article that 
the true length of government-caused delay is, in fact, no greater 
than the difference between the date on which a reasonably 
prudent businessman, subject to product liability claims, would 
commercially release a product and the date on which the 
government commercially releases the product by approval of a 
new drug application.206 
These arguments would be made throughout the legislative debate.  
Senator Metzenbaum commented in 1983, for instance, that “[a]ny 
responsible firm would do tests to make sure that its products are safe and 
effective.”207 
Professor Peltzman’s study had shown, however, that the research 
required by the FDA was more than the companies would do on their own.208  
The PTO, which consistently supported patent term restoration, responded 
directly to this criticism in 1983.  Every year, the Commissioner of Patents 
reported that patent owners sought private relief from the legislature because 
they could not bring their invention to the market for one reason or 
another.209  He explained that the Administration generally opposed relief for 
commercialization delays.210  “[T]he patent system is kind of a fail-safe 
system itself,” he commented, and “the people who enter it take the chance 
that, for one reason or another, they may not be able to achieve the full 
seventeen years.”211  The drug and agricultural chemical industries, however, 
 
 205  COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1981, S. REP. NO. 
97-138, at 22 (1981)  (additional views of Sens. Kennedy & Metzenbaum). 
 206  Engelberg, supra note 200, at 35.   
 207  The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 13 (1983); see id. at 
44; see also COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1982, H.R REP. 
NO. 97-696, at 22 (1982) (dissenting views of Rep. Frank) (“Surely it is not equitable to expect 
the elderly and ill, who are often already in severe financial straits, to pay the price for patent 
extension, especially where the extension is not even necessary in order to promote the 
development of new drugs.”). 
 208  See supra Section III.A.2. 
 209  The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 27 (1983) (statement 
of Gerald Mossinghoff). 
 210  Id. 
 211  Id. 
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were “a classic exception to that.”212  While any inventor might perform 
modest testing, most of the premarket research and development program 
was required instead by federal regulations.213 
Opponents made a related argument that restoring patents might not 
prompt more innovation.214  In 1981, the Congressional Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA), responding to an inquiry from 
Representative Waxman, wrote that restoration would “enhance” innovation 
incentives,215 but the Office could not guarantee that innovation would 
increase.216  Restoration might just “compensate” patent owners for research 
they would have done anyway.217  Representative Gore complained in 1982 
that patent term restoration would increase prescription drug prices “without 
any assurances whatever that any of the extra revenue derived would be 
reinvested in pharmaceutical R&D.”218  When this argument was raised in 
1983, the Commissioner of Patents similarly could not “guarantee” that 
restoration would lead to breakthroughs.  There was, however, a 
“demonstrable period of time” during which marketing of drugs was 
“delayed beyond what most other inventions are.”219  Moreover, “throughout 
the many years of its existence, our patent system has encouraged innovation 
through the incentives it provides.”220  And “[a]s these incentives are 
diminished, so is the encouragement which the patent system might 
otherwise have provided.”221 
Opponents also made two significant arguments about drug patenting 
practices, which—despite credible responses from supporters of 
restoration—had enough traction to prompt changes to the Kastenmeier 
drafts. 
 
 
 212  Id. 
 213  Id. at 25. 
 214  Health and the Env’t Misc.—Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and 
the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 340 (1981) (“[W]hat evidence 
do we have that restoring or lengthening the patent term would reduce the decline in 
innovation?”); id. at 333 (“If we have patent term restoration legislation enacted, would Merck 
increase its research and development budget . . . by investing additional revenues in research 
and development?”).  
 215  U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PATENT-TERM EXTENSION AND THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 45 (1981) [hereinafter OTA Report].  
 216  Id. at 4.  
 217  Id. at 65.  
 218  Al Gore, Jr., Patent Term Extension: An Expensive and Unnecessary Giveaway, 1 
HEALTH AFFS. 25, 32 (1982). 
 219  The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 17 (1983); id. at 22. 
 220  Innovation and Patent Law Reform, supra note 201, at 47. 
 221  Id. 
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First, they argued that drug inventors filed patents earlier than 
necessary, so that the shortened effective patent life was the inventors’ own 
fault.222  For instance, Representative Gore described a strong negative 
relationship between effective patent life and the period between patent filing 
and clinical trials.223  He inferred that companies delayed clinical testing, 
which, he argued, should “end the debate over patent term extension.”224 
The relationship between the preclinical period and shortened effective 
patent life was well known.  Eisman and Wardell had confirmed that one-
quarter of the erosion of patent life was attributable to an increase in the time 
between patent filing and start of clinical trials.225  Proponents of restoration 
simply disagreed about the significance of this finding.226  The regulatory 
framework requires a company to perform preclinical testing sufficient to 
support an application to conduct human trials.  This testing differs from, 
and is more extensive than, the testing needed to establish utility of a 
compound for patenting purposes.  Patent owners viewed the lengthening 
gap between patent filings and clinical trials as a function of preclinical 
regulatory requirements becoming more complex and time consuming in the 
1960s and 1970s.227 
Second, opponents argued that drug inventors filed continuation 
applications to delay issuance, and thus patent expiry, which meant that the 
effective patent life was not so short after all.228  Patent owners responded 
 
 222  E.g., OTA Report, supra note 215, at 66. 
 223  Gore, supra note 218, at 30. 
 224  Id. 
 225  Eisman & Wardell, supra note 80, at 20. 
 226  E.g., Drug Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and H.R. 1097 
Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th 
Cong. 129 (1983) (statement of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) that the 
increase in regulatory requirements included preclinical research which can consume as many 
as four years). 
 227  Before the 1960s, for instance, the FDA did not require nonclinical toxicology testing 
before human trials.  21 C.F.R. § 130.3 (1956).  After 1963, the agency required the results 
of pharmacology and toxicology studies sufficient in kind, duration, and scope to show that it 
was reasonably safe to conduct a first-in-humans test and that the described trials would assure 
the safety and rights of the trial subjects.  New Drugs, 28 Fed. Reg. 179 (Jan. 8, 1963) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130) (requiring investigational new applications to contain results of 
preclinical testing); Robert Temple, Development of Drug Law, Regulations, and Guidance 
in the United States, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF DRUGS 1645 (1994) (noting that in the 
1960s the FDA settled on the animal toxicity studies needed to justify human testing); 
Nonclinical Laboratory Studies, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,986 (Dec. 22, 1978) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pt. 58) (adding good laboratory practice regulations to ensure scientific integrity and 
validity of laboratory data).  And in the 1970s, the FDA published its first laboratory practices 
regulations, imposing substantial new requirements on all aspects of the planning, conduct, 
and reporting of preclinical studies, as well as inspection and disqualification of testing 
facilities.  Id. at 59,986, 59,990, 60,013–25. 
 228  E.g., Engelberg, supra note 200, at 39.  
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that this misunderstood how drug discovery and approval work. Sometimes 
an initial discovery leads to a broad genus claim, following which the firm 
studies the entire family to identify new compounds within the family that 
are more likely to result in a finished product that can be brought through the 
regulatory process.  The firm then prosecutes the individual compounds in 
continuing applications.  In the summer of 1984, when opponents continued 
to make these arguments, an executive testifying for American Home 
Products offered an example.229  The Squibb Corporation had patented the 
genus of 9-halosteroids and then developed two topical steroid products from 
the genus: Kenalog (triamcinolone acetonide) and Halog (halcinonide).230  
Prohibiting restoration of the patent claiming the novel active ingredient of 
the distinct drug product Kenalog—that is, requiring the firm to restore the 
earlier genus patent instead—would be inconsistent with the basic point of 
restoring patents compromised by regulatory requirements.231  Even though 
it had discovered the steroid class, the firm could not commercialize the 
invention of triamcinolone acetonide until it developed a finished product 
(formulation of triamcinolone acetonide and appropriate inactive 
ingredients, route of administration, dosage form, and strength), ran that 
product through the premarket regulatory paradigm, and substantiated 
specific claims about that product for the regulatory labeling.232  While the 
patents might be linked, the regulatory requirements for a triamcinolone 
acetonide product would not be different or less burdensome simply because 
the firm had earlier discovered the genus. 
Objections to continuations must also be placed in historical context.  
Before Congress changed the patent term in 1995, continuation patents could 
mitigate the truncation of patent life from testing requirements.  That is, a 
continuation slowed issuance of the patent, and if the patent issued later, it 
expired later.  Even under the restoration proposals, however, a continuation 
patent could never have an effective patent life exceeding the nominal 
statutory term of 17 years.  Although the restoration days would be added to 
a later expiry date, less of the patent term would have been lost to testing, so 
the company would receive fewer days in restoration.233  In 1981, OTA 
 
 229  Innovation and Patent Law Reform, supra note 201, at 438–39 (statement of John R. 
Stafford). 
 230  Id. 
 231  Id. 
 232  See supra Section II.A. 
 233  For instance, suppose clinical trials for a new drug began in 1986, and suppose the 
FDA approved the drug in 1996.  Consider a patent that issued on the day that trials started, 
in 1986.  Before restoration this patent would expire in 2003.  If the PTO restored all of the 
patent life consumed by testing, it would restore ten years, and the patent would expire in 
2013.  The new drug would therefore have a seventeen-year effective patent life, from 1996 
to 2013.  Now consider a patent that issued two years before FDA approval, thus in 1994.  
Before restoration this patent would expire in 2011.  If the PTO restored all of the patent life 
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recommended a cap on restoration measured from the date of filing the first 
patent application, in order to eliminate the benefit from filing continuation 
patents, or “extensions of long duration.”234  But as a mathematical matter, 
the effective patent life could never exceed seventeen years.235  So by 
“extensions of long duration,” OTA necessarily meant simply “extensions 
that lead to 17 years of effective patent life.”  The objection to use of 
continuations thus reflected a rejection of a basic goal of the proponents of 
patent term restoration: ensuring comparable patent terms for regulated 
patent owners. 
4. House Vote on the Proposal 
In May 1982, Representative Kastenmeier introduced revised 
language.236  As before, the proposal would restore up to seven years of 
patent life lost to testing and agency review.237  At the urging of generic 
companies and Public Citizen, however, the bill included provisions to 
penalize patent owners for long intervals between patent filings and clinical 
trials and to discourage continuation applications.238 
First, a patent owner would receive all of the regulatory review period 
after patent issuance until ten years after the earliest relevant patent 
application, but only half of the regulatory review period from years ten to 
twenty after the patent application.239  Second, the extended patent term 
could not expire more than twenty-seven years after the earliest patent 
application.240 Judge Lourie—then at SmithKline and chairing the patent 
policy committee of the innovative industry’s trade association, 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (PMA)—explained the number 
shortly after enactment.241  The PTO took an average of three years to process 
a patent application, Judge Lourie wrote, and the remaining premarket 
 
consumed by testing, it would restore two years, and the patent would expire in 2013.  The 
new drug would again have a seventeen-year effective patent life, from 1996 to 2013.  It could 
never have a longer effective patent life. 
 234  OTA Report, supra note 215, at 66. 
 235  See supra note 233. 
 236  The subcommittee considering the bill held a markup in March and forwarded the 
revised language to the full committee in May in the form of a clean bill with a new number.  
H.R. 6444, 97th Cong. (2d Sess. 1982). 
 237  Id. at 3 (proposing 35 U.S.C. § 155(a)(2)(B)). 
 238  See COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1982, H.R REP. 
NO. 97-696, at 8 (1982) (“This amendment was designed to encourage companies to file and 
process U.S. patent applications expeditiously and to complete regulatory related testing as 
rapidly as possible.”); id. at 7 (explaining that these changes responded to criticisms from the 
generic industry and Public Citizen).  
 239  H.R. 6444, supra note 236, at 2 (proposing that 35 U.S.C. § 155(a)(1) be amended to 
make the regulatory review period last from the start of clinical trials until FDA approval). 
 240  Id. at 3 (proposing 35 U.S.C. § 155(a)(2)(B)).  
 241  Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 530. 
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process averaged seven more years.242  The twenty-seven-year limit would 
allow the average experience to result in seventeen years of effective patent 
life.243 
But the new approach meant that some companies would be unable to 
secure seventeen years of effective patent life for their drugs.  If regulatory 
requirements led to a lengthy preclinical or clinical program, and the FDA 
approved the product more than ten years after the inventor filed his patent 
application, the company could no longer use a later-expiring continuation 
patent to secure seventeen years of effective patent life.244  Under earlier 
proposals and the Senate’s language, a continuation patent that issued in the 
final seven years before this drug’s approval could enjoy a seventeen-year 
term after its lost years were restored.245  This was no longer possible.  This 
bill also limited a company to one patent per regulatory review period, 
meaning, effectively, one patent per product.246  PTO did not object to 
capping the restoration of continuation patents, but it objected strenuously to 
limiting the patents eligible for restoration.247 
The House considered the bill through the summer of 1982.248  Public 
support was strong and included physician organizations (such as the 
American Academy of Dermatology, the American College of Cardiology, 
and the AMA), volunteer organizations devoted to improving health (such 
as the American Heart Association), academic institutions (such as Johns 
Hopkins University), medical schools and treatment centers (such as the 
University of Cincinnati Medical Center and the University of Wisconsin 
Medical School), government agencies (for instance, the EPA and FDA), and 
pharmacies (the National Association of Chain Drug Store), and wholesalers 
(the National Wholesale Druggists Association).249  Supporters of the bill 
placed the bill on the suspension calendar.250  In this scenario, a series of 
noncontroversial bills are bundled together for vote, and the time for debate 
 
 242  Id. 
 243  Id. 
 244  Again, the bill would have required the patent to expire twenty-seven years after the 
earliest application.  If the FDA approved the product ten years after the patent application, 
the company would have seventeen years of effective patent life (as twenty-seven minus ten).  
If the approval process took longer, the company would have fewer years. 
 245  These bills did not impose a twenty-seven year limit.  They did impose a seven-year 
cap.  E.g., S. 255, 97th Cong. § 155(a)(2) (1981).  If a patent issued in the final seven years 
before approval, the patent owner would receive back all of the years lost to the preapproval 
process.  It would, therefore, enjoy its full 17-year statutory term. 
 246  H.R. 6444, supra note 236 (proposed 35 U.S.C. § 155(a)(2)(C)).  
 247  See Innovation and Patent Law Reform, supra note 201, at 388–89. 
 248  See H.R. 6444, 97th Cong. (reported with amendments Aug. 4, 1982). 
 249  COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1982, H.R REP. NO. 
97-696, at 8–9 (1982). 
 250  Mossinghoff, supra note 24, at 188; Interview with Bill Corr (Mar. 29, 2018). 
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of each bill is limited.251  A two-thirds majority must vote to suspend the 
rules and pass the bill by voice vote.252 If a bill fails to receive two-thirds 
support, it returns to the House Rules Committee and is put through the 
regular committee process.253 Placement on the suspension calendar 
presumably reflected the fact that the Kastenmeier bill had strong bipartisan 
support and belief that the main objections from the prior winter had been 
addressed. 
On September 15, a majority of the House voted for passage.  But the 
bill fell five votes short of the supermajority needed.254  Explanations vary.  
One account reports heavy fog at airports in the East and Midwest that 
delayed several members who would have supported the bill.255  Another 
explains that Representatives Gore and Waxman worked the floor 
extensively on the day of the vote in order to defeat passage.256  Both 
explanations could be true. 
B. Generic Industry Policymaking Defeats 
During these same years, the generic companies experienced a series of 
policymaking defeats that propelled them to organize and push for 
legislation advancing their own interests.  These companies had marketed 
generic drugs since the 1930s. Many marketed generic drugs based on full 
applications containing clinical research, but, until the early 1980s, there 
were also two possibilities for market entry without research.  Developments 
at the FDA and in the courts in the 1970s through the early 1980s foreclosed 
these possibilities.  In the summer of 1983, Representative Waxman 
introduced legislation that would allow generic companies to reach the 
market earlier and on the basis of applications omitting clinical data.  While 
patent term restoration legislation would have lengthened effective patent 
life, this legislation would shorten exclusivity in the marketplace for 
patented drugs.  The arguments against patent term restoration became 
 
 251  Christopher M. Davis, How Measures Are Brought to the House Floor: A Brief 
Introduction, CONG. RES. SERV. (Sept. 16, 2005), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20067.pdf. 
 252  Mossinghoff, supra note 24, at 188. 
 253  Id. 
 254  Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 532. 
 255  Although it proved challenging to verify the fog or flight delays, the fifty members of 
the House who did not vote included one of the bill’s five sponsors, Jack Brooks (D-TX), as 
well as a half dozen Republicans from states on the East Coast and in the Midwest.  See 128 
CONG. REC. 23656-57 (Sept. 15, 1982) (e.g., Lyle Williams, Elwood Hillis, Thomas Hartnett, 
Ed Bethune, and Skip Bafalis).  At the same time, as Bill Schultz has pointed out to me, had 
the bill failed only because five supporting votes were delayed by weather, supporters could 
have brought the bill up for a new vote a few days later.  Email from William B. Schultz to 
Erika Lietzan (May 12, 2018). 
 256  Interview with Bill Corr (Mar. 29, 2018); Representative Henry Waxman, Author of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, CLAUSE 8 21:44–23:18 (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.clause8.tv/. 
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arguments for the generic drug pathway.  From this moment forward, the 
generic companies and their allies dominated the policymaking process, and 
the Kastenmeier proposal never had another meaningful chance of passage. 
1. Potential Pathways for Generic Drugs 
Understanding why the generic companies mobilized suddenly on their 
own behalf in 1983 requires a description of the policymaking defeats in the 
1970s and early 1980s, which in turn requires understanding the two possible 
pathways to market without safety and effectiveness data that evaporated in 
the early 1980s. 
i. Two Pathways for Copies of Pre-1962 Drugs 
The FDCA requires NDAs only for “new drugs.”257  From 1938 to 
1962, generic drugs reached the market without applications, on the theory 
that they were not new drugs in the first place.  Thus, after one company 
brought a new drug to market under an NDA, other companies launched 
copies without submitting applications.  Some concluded that the underlying 
drug was “generally recognized as safe” (thus, not a “new drug”) because of 
the NDA.258  Others relied on written opinions from the FDA, known as “old 
drug opinions.”259  After Congress amended the FDCA in 1962 to add an 
effectiveness requirement, the FDA withdrew these opinions.260  But the 
statute still excluded not-new drugs from the NDA requirement.  So the FDA 
decided to use rulemaking to determine which drugs were exempt.261  The 
agency never finalized the proposal, however, because it was concerned 
about losing regulatory control over drugs that it exempted.262 
Instead, it used rulemaking to develop an “abbreviated new drug 
application” (ANDA) pathway.263  An ANDA would contain information 
 
 257  21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1938).  From 1938 to 1962, “new drug” meant any drug not 
“generally recognized . . . as safe” under the conditions described in its labeling.  21 U.S.C. § 
321(p) (1938).  Since 1962 it has meant a drug that is not generally recognized as safe and 
effective under these conditions. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1962).  It also means a drug that is 
generally recognized as safe and effective but that has not been marketed to a material extent 
and for a material time under the conditions in its labeling.  Id. 
 258  PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LA: CASES AND MATERIALS 775–76 (4th 
ed. 2014). 
 259  Id. 
 260  New Drugs, 33 Fed. Reg. 7758 (May 28, 1968) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130). 
 261  Drugs in Finished Dosage Form, 33 Fed. Reg. 7762 (May 28, 1968) (to be codified at 
21 C.F.R. pt. 130). 
 262  Condition for Marketing Human Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 26,142, 26,144 
(June 20, 1975) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130). 
 263  Food Additives, 34 Fed. Reg. 2672, 2673 (proposed Feb. 27, 1969) (to be codified at 
21 C.F.R. pt. 121); New Drugs, 35 Fed. Reg. 6574 (Apr. 24, 1970) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pt. 130). 
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about the generic drug and its manufacturing process, and it would include 
bioavailability information and any preclinical or clinical data developed by 
the applicant relating to adverse effects.264  The application would also 
confirm that the drug complied with specifications in an official 
compendium or that specifications and testing ensured the drug’s identity, 
strength, quality, and purity.265  But unlike an NDA, it would not contain 
clinical safety or effectiveness data. 
A generic company could file an ANDA to copy a “new drug” that had 
been the subject of an NDA before the 1962 amendments, but only after the 
FDA reviewed the first drug and confirmed its effectiveness, which the 
agency did as part of its implementation of the 1962 amendments.266  The 
FDA also expected companies already marketing copies to file ANDAs.267 
ii. Copying Post-1962 Drugs 
By 1975, the FDA had received over 6000 ANDAs for copies of pre-
1962 innovator drugs.268  Also, in the 1970s, patents on post-1962 drugs 
began to expire.  Generic firms that wanted to market copies could not file 
ANDAs, however, because these were reserved for copies of pre-1962 drugs. 
The FDA sought to fill the gap with a “paper NDA” pathway, which 
permitted generic companies to submit published literature as proof that their 
copies were safe and effective.269  But as soon as the agency approved the 
first paper NDA, it faced litigation: suits from the innovative industry 
arguing, among other things, that the policy was inconsistent with the statute 
and, separately, that it required notice and comment rulemaking, as well as 
suits from generic companies seeking to compel approval of their paper 
NDAs after the agency stayed its policy.270  Ultimately, the agency was 
permitted to proceed, but there was rarely enough information in the 
 
 264  New Drugs, 35 Fed. Reg. 6574, 6575 (Apr. 24, 1970) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 
130). 
 265  New Drugs, 35 Fed. Reg. at 6575. 
 266  Food Additives, 34 Fed. Reg. 2672, 2673 (proposed Feb. 27, 1969) (to be codified at 
21 C.F.R. pt. 121). 
 267  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR FDA STAFF AND INDUSTRY: MARKETED 
UNAPPROVED DRUGS–COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE 10 (Sept. 19, 2011), https://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianc 
eregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm070290.pdf. 
 268  Condition for Marketing Human Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 26,142, 26,145 
(June 20, 1975) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130). 
 269  Response to Petition Seeking Withdrawal, 45 Fed. Reg. 82,052 (Dec. 12, 1980) 
(announcing and defending policy, and responding to petition asking it to withdraw policy); 
Response to Petition Seeking Withdrawal, 45 Fed. Reg. at 82,058 (“paper NDAs are based on 
published literature”). 
 270  Memorandum from Mary Francis Lowe to Mark Novitch (Jan. 23, 1981), reprinted in 
Competition in the Drug Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 63–65 (1981). 
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published literature for a paper NDA strategy to work.  This left two 
possibilities for generic firms: old drug status or expansion of the ANDA 
regulation.  Innovators opposed both, on the ground that these policies would 
allow generic firms to “free ride” on their original research.271  This, they 
argued, would be unprecedented.272  The FDA had treated the safety and 
effectiveness data in NDAs as trade secret for decades, refusing to release 
the data or allow competitors to rely on them.273 
The FDA seriously considered the old drug theory.274  In the agency’s 
view, a quartet of Supreme Court rulings in 1973 broadly sustained its 
primary jurisdiction to determine the status of drugs.275  In 1974, therefore, 
an agency official explained the plan.276  The FDA would publish a 
monograph (regulation) specifying the conditions under which a particular 
drug could be marketed without premarket approval.  The agency would 
begin with copies of pre-1962 drugs, but post-1962 drugs would eventually 
be covered.277  In June 1975, the FDA promised that the proposal was 
imminent.278  The next month, a federal court commented that the FDA 
“certainly” had the power to promulgate these regulations.279  Concerned 
about the legal arguments raised by innovators, however, the agency never 
 
 271  William W. Vodra, The Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978: Putting Some Economic 
Issues Into Different Contexts, 1 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 184, 189 (1980). 
 272  Drug Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and H.R. 1097 Before 
the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 
126 (1983) (statement of PMA). 
 273  E.g., Food and Drug Administration, 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,612 (Dec. 24, 1974) 
(“The Food and Drug Administration has on numerous occasions testified before Congress 
that current statutory prohibitions prevent disclosure of useful information contained in the 
agency’s files, and, particularly, data relating to the safety and effectiveness of drugs.”); Food 
and Drug Administration, 39 Fed. Reg. at 44,634 (“The Commissioner advises that, since 
1938, it has been the consistent administrative interpretation that [section 301(j), which refers 
to trade secrets] can encompass animal and human data[.]”); id. at 44,635 (“[T]he 
Commissioner concludes that the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1905 and the trade secrets 
exemption to the Freedom of Information Act are clearly applicable to such data.”). 
 274  Condition for Marketing Human Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 26,142, 26,146 
(June 20, 1975) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130). 
 275  Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973), Ciba Corp. v. 
Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640 (1973), Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973), 
USV Pharm. Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 655 (1973); Condition for Marketing Human 
Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 26,142, 26,146 (June 20, 1975) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pt. 130) (explaining the FDA’s interpretation of the rulings). 
 276  Mary A. McEniry, Drug Monographs, 29 FOOD DRUG COSM L.J. 166 (1974). 
 277  Id. at 168–70. 
 278  See Condition for Marketing Human Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 26,142, 26,146 
(June 20, 1975) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130) (noting that the FDA decided “to proceed 
with the development of an old drug monograph system for regulating human prescription 
drugs” and stating that the FDA “anticipates that these regulations will be published as a 
proposal in the near future”). 
 279  Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v. Weinberger, 425 F. Supp. 890, 894 (D.D.C. 1975). 
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published the proposal.  Instead it proposed legislation authorizing the 
creation of drug monographs, which would effectively exempt generic drugs 
from the NDA requirement.280 
The FDA also considered permitting ANDAs for copies of post-1962 
drugs.  Indeed, in 1978, it announced it would draft regulations permitting 
these ANDAs.281  Draft regulations were leaked to the press in early 1982.282  
Under this proposal, applications could be submitted, once the FDA issued 
a finding that a particular innovative drug product was “suitable” for 
ANDAs.283  These ANDAs would contain the same information as ANDAs 
proposing copies of pre-1962 drugs.284  The Bureau of Drugs proposed a 
fifteen-year waiting period, to ensure sufficient incentives for innovation, 
and it assumed a generic firm would need another two years to perform 
testing and secure approval.285  Facing opposition from both sides, the FDA 
abandoned the effort.286  Innovators objected to the fact that ANDAs would 
 
 280  See Vodra, supra note 271, at 194 (noting that the FDA proposed the legislation).  
Under the Drug Regulation Reform Act, a company could petition the FDA to issue a 
monograph describing drug products authorized for licensure under the monograph and 
specifying the labeling required.  For the first five years after monograph publication, consent 
of the original NDA holder would have been required for market entry. S. 2755, 95th Cong. 
(introduced Mar. 16, 1978); H.R. 11611, 95th Cong. (introduced Mar. 16, 1978).  Sen. 
Kennedy and Rep. Waxman reintroduced the bill in 1979.  S. 1075, 96th Con. (introduced 
Oct. 2, 1979); H.R. 4258, 96th Cong. (introduced May 30, 1979).  The Senate passed the bill 
in October 1979 (with the five-year window changed to seven years.  Drug Legislation: 
Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and H.R. 1097 Before the Subcomm. on Health 
& the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 113 (1983).  But the House 
took no action after committee referral.   
 281  Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 43 Fed. Reg. 39,126, 39,128 (Sept. 1, 1978) (to 
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 310 and 21 C.F.R. pt. 314) (announcing plan to “extend the ANDA 
concept at a later time to post-1962 drug products by publishing criteria for making such a 
determination about these drugs”); see also Abbreviated New Drug Applications for New 
Drugs Approved After October 10, 1962, 47 Fed. Reg. 1765, 1767 (Jan. 13, 1982) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314) (stating that the FDA would publish a notice of proposed 
rulemaking in March 1982 for ANDAs copying drugs approved after October 10, 1962). 
 282  See Post-1962 ANDA Reg Proposal in the Works Would Build In 15-Year Gap 
Between Pioneer Approval Date and Generic Eligibility for ANDA, PINK SHEET, Mar. 8, 1982. 
 283  Draft Proposed Rule, New Drugs Approved After October 10, 1962, for Human Use: 
Proposal to Accept Abbreviated New Drug Applications (Feb. 8, 1982) at 23, 27 (on file with 
author).  
 284  Id. at 30. 
 285  Id. at 24.  Because “a 17-year period coincides with the statutory patent period,” the 
Bureau believed “it would provide an adequate period to maintain drug research and 
incentives.”  Drug Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and H.R. 1097 
Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th 
Cong. 118 (1983) (statement of PMA, quoting FDA documents); see also id. at 19 (comments 
of Rep. Waxman); id. at 32.  
 286  Drug Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and H.R. 1097 Before 
the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 
116–25 (1983) (statement of PMA, quoting FDA documents).  Although the FDA abandoned 
the effort to extend its ANDA regulation to post-1962 new drugs, the ANDA regulation for 
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rely on the data in their applications.  Generic firms objected to the waiting 
period.287  The Bureau of Drugs submitted the proposed regulations to the 
Secretary but the draft went no further.288 
2. Developments in 1982 and 1983 
The lack of an abbreviated pathway did not mean a lack of generic 
competition.  Some generic companies filed full applications for copies of 
post-1962 drugs.  The number of new generic prescriptions filled in 1980 
was 6.8% more than it had been in 1979 and 275% more than it had been in 
1966.289  Generic drugs comprised 14.7% of all prescriptions filled by 1980, 
compared to 6.4% in 1966.290  Various federal agencies worked with the 
states to facilitate the cost savings that these generic drugs promised.  
Between 1976 and 1979, nearly 80% of the states enacted automatic 
substitution laws, which would allow—or in some cases direct—pharmacists 
to substitute a less expensive drug product that was therapeutically 
equivalent to the prescribed product.291  The FTC and the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare issued a model law in January 1979 to help 
the states develop legislation for drug product selection.292  The FDA then 
began publishing an annual list of approved drug products and therapeutic 
equivalence determinations.293 
Generic companies nevertheless continued to argue that once the FDA 
approved an NDA, the underlying active ingredient became a not-new drug 
that could be marketed by others without premarket approval.  By the end of 
1981, the courts of appeals were divided on the issue.294  In March 1982, the 
Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for certiorari in the Fifth 
Circuit Generix case, raising the possibility that it would confirm the FDA’s 
view that generic drugs require applications.295  During the same month, the 
FDA abandoned the idea of expanding its ANDA regulation to permit copies 
 
pre-1962 drugs remained on the books.  
 287  Id. at 119 (statement of PMA, quoting FDA documents) 
 288  Id. 
 289  Top 200 Drugs of 1980, PHARMACY TIMES, April 1981. 
 290  Id. 
 291  Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 202, at 43.   
 292  See Therapeutically Equivalent Drugs, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,582, 72,593 (Oct. 31, 1980) 
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 20) (describing Model Act). 
 293  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC 
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (ORANGE BOOK) (1st ed. 1980). 
 294  United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 654 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1981) (agreeing with 
generic industry that “new drug” refers to the active ingredient alone); Premo Pharm. Lab. 
Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that “new drug” definition applies 
to finished products not just active ingredients). 
 295  United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 455 U.S. 988 (1982). 
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of post-1962 drugs.296  Applications would need full safety and effectiveness 
research. 
Two additional developments impelled the generic companies to seek 
legislative relief.  First, in July 1982, a federal court in California ruled that 
manufacturing and testing generic doxycycline during the innovator’s patent 
term, to obtain FDA approval to market after the patent term, infringed the 
patent.297  The court had already found that International Rectifier 
Corporation (IRC) infringed Pfizer’s patent on doxycycline by making, 
using, and selling generic doxycycline in the United States.298  After the court 
issued an injunction, IRC used its infringing doxycycline to make substantial 
quantities of infringing products, which it tested for bioequivalence to 
Pfizer’s product in order to seek FDA approval.299  When Pfizer asked the 
court to hold IRC in contempt, IRC argued that its activities fell within the 
common law experimental use privilege.300  In July 1982, the court rejected 
the argument.301  Use of infringing doxycycline to manufacture and test 
infringing products and submit the resulting data to the FDA was designed 
to determine marketability, gain a commercial advantage, and indirectly 
promote product sales, so the experimental use privilege did not apply.302 
Second, in March 1983 the Supreme Court ruled in Generix, agreeing 
with the FDA that generic drugs are new drugs that require approved 
applications.303  The statutory inquiry whether a drug is “generally 
recognized as safe and effective” (and thus not-new) focuses on the finished 
drug product rather than the active ingredient.304  A proposed generic drug 
product would therefore be a “new drug” even if the FDA had previously 
approved the active ingredient.305  This decision ended the argument that 
generic companies could bring copies to market simply by citing approved 
products.  A group of generic companies sued the FDA in June 1983, seeking 
to compel the agency to resume the ANDA rulemaking that it had abandoned 
and asking the FDA to approve copies of post-1962 drugs based on 
ANDAs.306  Had the agency complied, however, it would have faced suit 
 
 296  See supra Section III.C.1. 
 297  Pfizer, Inc. v. Int’l Rectifier Corp., No. 73-58, 1982 WL 51039 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 
1982). 
 298  Id. at *1. 
 299  Id. 
 300  Id. 
 301  Id. at *8. 
 302  Id. at *7. 
 303  United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453 (1983). 
 304  Id. at 459. 
 305  Id. at 460. 
 306  Complaint, Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. Heckler, No. 88-4817 (S.D.N.Y. June 
24, 1983).  The parties eventually agreed that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments mooted the 
case.  Stipulation and Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice, Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs., 
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from innovators. 
C. Development and Passage of the Generic Drug Bill 
The vote on the Kastenmeier bill occurred in the fall of 1982, between 
the ruling in International Rectifier (July 1982) and the ruling in Generix 
(March 1983).  The generic industry’s chances of reaching the market 
without performing clinical trials after patent expiry were thus already 
waning.  Bill Haddad, by now the president and chief executive officer of 
the new generic industry association, began to shift the group’s focus to the 
impact of patents and exclusivity on drug prices.307  Haddad was a veteran 
on the Hill, having worked for Senator Kefauver during the drug pricing 
hearings that preceded the 1962 amendments to the FDCA.308  By early 
August, he had persuaded the major papers to reverse their positions and 
oppose patent term restoration.309 
The more aggressive focus on pricing aligned with arguments that 
consumer groups—particularly Public Citizen—had been making all along.  
In 1981, for instance, Schultz had recommended compulsory licensing of 
drug patents three to five years after new drug approval, arguing that “the 
monopoly period is too long, not too short.”310  With the encouragement of 
GPIA and Public Citizen, sympathetic members of Congress now focused 
on the high profit margin of the pharmaceutical industry.311  This, then, could 
 
Inc. v. Heckler, No. 88-4817 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 7, 1985). 
 307  CHRISTOPHER SCOTT HARRISON, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL PRICING OF 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 57–58 (2004) (noting that Haddad’s strategy was to add the price 
dimension, which divided the support for patent term restoration). 
 308  Id. at 57. 
 309  E.g., An Unwarranted Patent Stretch, N.Y. TIMES: ARCHIVES (Aug. 7, 1982), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/08/07/opinion/an-unwarranted-patent-stretch.html 
(“Congress has let itself be persuaded, after a hasty review, that the extension is fair and will 
foster innovation.  But the drug industry’s case is dubious. Its chief premise is that extension 
will restore the time unfairly lose from patent life by having to prove to the Government that 
new drugs are safe and effective. But the testing of drugs in animal and clinical trials is 
something that any responsible company would wish to do anyway.”); Patents and Medicine, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1982 (“In fact, there isn’t much evidence that drug research has been 
stifled, and there should be no concern over the industry’s profitability.  Drug research is 
important, but so is encouraging competition and lower prices for consumers.”). 
 310  Health and the Env’t Misc.—Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and 
the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 406 (1981) (testimony of 
Sidney Wolfe and William Schultz). 
 311  E.g., Gore, supra note 218, at 30; Competition in the Drug Industry: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th 
Cong. 8 (1981) (statement of Sidney Wolfe) (“I would estimate that most of these drugs by 
the time they come off patent will have yielded their manufacturers hundreds of millions of 
dollars, if not, in the case of several of them, billions of dollars in sales by the time they come 
off patent. That raises questions to me as to how much more protection of investments is 
needed.”); COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1981, S. REP. 
NO. 97-138, at 21 (1981) (additional views of Sen. Kennedy and Sen. Metzenbaum) (noting 
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be another explanation for the failure of the Kastenmeier bill—the generic 
industry’s increased sense of urgency about a pathway to market and 
Haddad’s aggressive focus on drug prices, which aligned with arguments 
Public Citizen had been making.  Indeed, Public Citizen now claims credit 
for defeat of the Kastenmeier bill, noting on its website that its “lobbying 
efforts halt[ed] plans to extend drug manufacturers’ monopolies on their 
products by up to seven years.”312 
The vote on the Kastenmeier bill in September 1982 was nevertheless 
close.  The Commissioner of Patents later called the vote “a wake-up call” 
for the generic companies.313  They intensified their opposition to patent term 
restoration, and subsequent efforts to revive the Kastenmeier approach 
failed.314  After the Generix decision in March, they turned to Representative 
Waxman for help with a statutory pathway for generic drugs. 
Waxman had joined the House in 1975, making it clear that his 
priorities were health and environmental issues.315  He had introduced the 
FDA’s Drug Regulation Reform Act in 1979 to create a monograph old-drug 
system for generic drugs, and he was quick to start the statutory process for 
abbreviated NDAs in July 1983.316  His placeholder bill would have added 
one sentence to the new drug provision of the FDCA, exempting companies 
from the obligation to submit full applications for copies of drugs approved 
in the past, provided their abbreviated applications satisfy “appropriate 
standards of identity, strength, quality, purity, stability, bioavailability, and 
bioequivalence” in relation to the approved drug.317  Over the summer, he 
convened a series of hearings in the House that mostly featured witnesses 
from or allied with generic companies.318 
The discussions that followed, from July 1983 to May 1984, happened 
mostly behind closed doors.319  The dynamics are important to understand.  
 
that pharmaceutical companies are “the Nation’s fourth most profitable industry”). 
 312  Accomplishments, PUB. CITIZEN, https://www.citizen.org/about/accomplishments/ 
accomplishments-1885-1980 (last visited Oct. 24, 2018). 
 313  Mossinghoff, supra note 24, at 188. 
 314  E.g., S. 1306, 98th Cong. (introduced May 17, 1983); H.R. 3502, 98th Cong. 
(introduced June 30, 1983).  
 315  See Waxman, Henry Arnold, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES: UNITED STATES HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/People/Listing/W/WAXMAN,-Henry-Arnold-
(W000215)/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2018). 
 316  See supra note 280. 
 317  H.R. 3605, 98th Cong. (introduced July 19, 1983).  
 318  E.g., Drug Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and H.R. 1097 
Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th 
Cong. 51 (1983). 
 319  Lewis Engman and Peter Hutt (president of and counsel to PMA, respectively) handled 
the discussions for the innovative industry, and William Haddad and Alfred Engelberg 
(president of and counsel to GPIA, respectively) represented the generic industry. Lourie, 
Account, supra note 24, at 534.  Rep. Waxman and his staff were also deeply involved.  Much 
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Patent owners had lost the vote on patent term restoration, which meant they 
could not secure its passage on their own.  In addition, patent owners were 
seeking a remedy for the loss of their patent term, which meant that any offer 
would be better than the status quo, and they had nothing to bargain with—
the only thing they could give, so to speak, was the opposite of what they 
sought, that is, exclusivity in the market.  Because of the House vote, patent 
owners could make no credible threat of tabling the discussion and trying a 
more favorable Congress, and because they had nothing to offer, this would 
not have been an effective threat in any case.  Furthermore, because the 
generic companies not only opposed restoration but sought the opposite 
outcome—not merely to defeat the push for longer patent life, but actually 
to shorten exclusivity in the market—the innovators would do well to cling 
to the status quo. 
Patent owners and their allies continued to argue at hearings that 
restoration would restore incentives to innovate and ensure that regulated 
patent owners were not treated differently.  Professor Grabowski explained, 
for instance, that patent term restoration would restore lost incentives.320  
Because patent term restoration “increases the expected returns from new 
drug innovation and also provides firms that are successful in new product 
introductions with increased profits and cash flow,” he told a Senate 
subcommittee, “we would expect it to lead to significant increases in R&D 
investments.”321  The Administration remained firmly in support.  For 
instance, the Deputy Commissioner of Food and Drugs testified in 1983 that 
eighteen percent of new drugs had five or fewer years of effective patent life 
remaining, and five to seven percent had no patent protection left.322  The 
Commissioner of Patents explained that the Administration “recognizes the 
need for remedial action to increase innovation” and “strongly” supported 
enactment of patent term restoration.323 One inventor “should not be treated 
differently from another.”324 
 
of the back-and-forth (especially beginning in January 1984) was leaked to and reported by 
the trade press. 
 320  See The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 130 (1983) 
(statement of Henry Grabowski). 
 321  Id. 
 322  Drug Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and H.R. 1097 Before 
the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 
13–16 (1983) (statement of Mark Novitch). 
 323  The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 16 (1983) (statement 
of Gerald Mossinghoff). 
 324  Id. at 17 (statement of Gerald Mossinghoff); see also id. at 17–18 (“Certain sectors of 
our industry dealing with technologies which are subject to premarket regulatory review, and 
among the most innovative of our industries, are not receiving the full benefit of the patent 
system to which they are entitled by virtue of having disclosed their inventions to the 
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A federal court ruling in October 1983 strengthened the generic 
industry’s hand by permitting generic companies to engage in 
experimentation during the patent term.325  Roche Products held a patent for 
flurazepam hydrochloride, the active ingredient in Dalmane.  Bolar 
Pharmaceuticals imported five kilograms from a foreign manufacturer, 
intending to produce flurazepam capsules, which it would study for purposes 
of submitting its own application.  It planned to apply to the FDA before 
patent expiry in January 1984, but it would not market the product until after 
patent expiry.  The trial court ruled that Bolar’s “limited experimental use of 
flurazepam” did not infringe Roche’s patent.326  Bolar had persuaded the 
court that its use was de minimis and that it would not realize any commercial 
benefit before patent expiry.327  If Bolar could not begin the testing process 
until after patent expiry, the court commented, Roche would enjoy a de facto 
patent extension of several years, which was “not a right or benefit granted 
by the patent law.”328 
Negotiators agreed in principle in January 1984, but Waxman’s first 
full draft—not circulated for comment until April 1984—caught patent 
owners off guard with provisions that had not been part of the agreement.329  
On April 23, while stakeholders were considering the language, the newly 
constituted United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed 
the New York ruling.330  Bolar’s manufacture and testing did not fall within 
the common law experimental use privilege. While Bolar was indeed 
performing experiments, “unlicensed experiments conducted with a view to 
the adaption of the patented invention to the experimenter’s business” violate 
the patent owner’s right to exclude others from using his invention.  Bolar 
was not engaged in “scientific inquiry”—it had “definite, cognizable, and 
not insubstantial commercial purposes.”331  Although the court of appeals 
was sympathetic to complaints that regulatory approval requirements 
effectively extended the patent, it declined Bolar’s invitation to create a “new 
 
public.”). 
 325  Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 572 F. Supp. 255 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev’d, 733 
F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 326  Id. at 258. 
 327  The New York court distinguished the California ruling, because IRC had reaped 
commercial value over a two-year period.  Id. at 257. 
 328  Id. 
 329  Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 534–35.  See ANDA/Patent Restoration Proposal 
Has Reached First Legislative Form: Discussion Draft Distributed in DC on April 5, After 
Two Months in the Mil, PINK SHEET, Apr. 9, 1984 (referring to the draft as “the product of two 
months of work by Waxman’s Health Subcmte. staff”). 
 330  Bolar, 733 F.2d at 858. 
 331  Id. at 863. 
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exception” for “FDA-required testing.”332 
With this ruling, Waxman’s language, which included an experimental 
use exception for a patent owner’s competitors, reversed settled law.  The 
patent bar became “increasingly distressed” about this exception.333  
Legislative staff made only modest changes before releasing a second 
discussion draft, however, and left the exception in place.334  The hostility of 
the drafts to drug patents prompted agrochemical companies to seek 
severance from the pending bill, but the drug patent owners did not have this 
option.335  The primary negotiator for PMA, representing the innovators, 
later commented that he had “no leverage” after loss of the House vote, and 
that “negotiating” with Representative Waxman was “one of the worst 
experiences” of his career.336  Further discussions did not materially improve 
prospects for drug patent owners. 
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Representative Waxman introduced 
the revised language on June 12 and 21, respectively, presenting it as a fait 
accompli.337  The one-paragraph provision for generic applications had 
evolved into nearly thirty pages governing the content of, and procedures 
for, submission and review of abbreviated applications, as well as a complex 
scheme for premarket resolution of patent disputes between drug patent 
owners and generic applicants.338  An abbreviated application would cite the 
innovator’s application and, rather than containing its own safety and 
effectiveness data, rely on the data the innovator had submitted.339  For a new 
chemical entity approved between January 1982 and enactment, however, 
these data could not be used—the FDA could not approve an ANDA—until 
ten years had passed.340  No other timing restrictions applied; the data in other 
innovator applications—whether approved before 1982 or after enactment—
could be used immediately.  The bill also reversed the Federal Circuit ruling, 
permitting a patent owner’s competitors to manufacture and test infringing 
 
 332  Id. at 863–64. 
 333  Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 540. 
 334  Id. at 538. 
 335  See H.R. 5529, 98th Cong. (introduced April 26, 1984) (proposing patent term 
restoration for animal drugs and biologics, pesticides, and chemicals regulated under TSCA). 
 336  Email from Peter Hutt to Erika Lietzan (Aug. 21, 2017) (on file with author); 
Representative Henry Waxman, Author of the Hatch-Waxman Act, CLAUSE 8 30:11–30:45 
(Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.clause8.tv/ (“They did not have leverage after that loss and when 
I was chairman of the subcommittee.”).   
 337  S. 2748, 98th Cong. (1984); H.R. 3605, 98th Cong. (1984) [hereafter JUNE 
LANGUAGE]; see also PMA’s Engman and GPIA’s Haddad Will Explain Patent 
Restoration/ANDA Compromise at Rep. Kastenmeier’s Hearing June 6; PMA Endorses Bill, 
PINK SHEET (June 4, 1984), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS006685. 
 338  JUNE LANGUAGE, supra note 337. 
 339  Id. at proposed 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
 340  Id. at proposed 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(D). 
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products during the patent term.341 
The patent restoration provisions differed in four respects from 
proposals of the past.  Every difference shortened the time that PTO would 
restore. 
First, PTO would restore only half the clinical testing period (after 
patent issuance).342  The Kastenmeier bill had applied a fifty percent 
recovery rule to clinical trials continuing more than ten years after the patent 
application.  The average patentee would thus receive his lost time back and 
could enjoy the nominal seventeen-year term.  Under the Waxman bill, in 
contrast, no drug inventor could ever receive all of his lost patent life back.  
Fifty percent of the patent term during testing was permanently forfeited.  
Second, PTO would restore no more than five years, no matter how long 
testing and FDA review took.343  The notion of a cap was not new, but prior 
bills had restored every day of lost life and applied a cap based on average 
clinical experience, ensuring that the average firm would enjoy the nominal 
seventeen-year term.  The generic drug bill applied the cap after the fifty 
percent penalty, and the number was arbitrary.344  The cap had no function 
other than to reduce the amount of patent life restored. 
Third, total effective patent life would be limited to fourteen years.345  
The bill imposed a number lower than the nominal patent term and the 
effective patent life enjoyed by other inventors.  No one pretended this was 
anything but an effort to shorten the patent life of drugs.346  The head of the 
generic trade association later commented that restoring even just seven 
years of the lost patent term “would have destroyed the generic industry.”347  
In other words, even after the bill gave generic companies the right to rely 
on innovator testing data and the right to make and use patented drugs for 
testing during the patent term, drug inventors would have to enjoy a shorter 
patent term than other inventors for generic companies to have a viable 
 
 341  Id. at proposed 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
 342  Id. at proposed 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(2). 
 343  Id. at proposed 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(4). 
 344  Mossinghoff, supra note 24, at 191 (“numbers pulled out of the air”); Interview with 
Bill Corr (Mar. 29, 2018) (characterizing the numbers as “just balancing”). 
 345  JUNE LANGUAGE, supra note 337, at proposed 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(3). 
 346  There were precedents for the number, to be sure. Before 1861, the initial term of a 
utility patent had been fourteen years.  An Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, § 1, 1 
Stat. 109, 110 (Apr. 10, 1790).  Today design patents last fifteen years. 35 U.S.C. § 173.  But 
the legislative history does not suggest either precedent was considered.  The Commissioner 
of Patents later reported that the number was arbitrary.  Mossinghoff, supra note 24, at 191.  
An economist involved in the discussions reports “folklore” that Haddad “at hearings put up 
a poster showing that many leading products had a life of 14 years before being largely 
supplanted by brand competition and that was the basis” for the 14-year limit. Email from 
Henry Grabowski to Erika Lietzan (Aug. 25, 2017) (on file with author).   
 347  Shuler, supra note 194, at 27. 
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business model.  Finally, the bill limited the patents that could be restored, 
generally disallowing extension of a patent if the compound had been 
claimed in an earlier issued patent.348  This reflected the generic industry’s 
complaints about drug patenting practices, but it would not survive the 
summer. 
With the national conventions and upcoming presidential election 
preoccupying policymakers and compressing the legislative schedule, 
Senator Hatch informed the innovative trade association that the generic 
drug provisions would be enacted with or without their support.349  PMA’s 
board of directors voted, narrowly and over vigorous objection, to endorse 
the legislation.350 
The House Energy and Commerce Committee reported the language 
the day it was introduced, after a hearing that “lasted barely thirty 
minutes.”351  Representative Bliley complained, calling it “distressing and 
regrettable that this Committee has reported a complex, lengthy, and highly 
significant piece of legislation without holding hearings in either the Health 
Subcommittee or in the full Committee and after what can only be described 
as a pro forma markup.”352  Six days later, on June 27, a subcommittee of the 
House Judiciary Committee held a hearing at which the Patent Office 
objected to the provision disallowing restoration of later-issued patents and 
to the experimental use exception.353  Although the two industry trade 
associations endorsed the legislation, a substantial group of innovators—the 
ten largest members of PMA—dissented on the same grounds and also 
objected to use of their testing data.354  These objections were bolstered by 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, released the same 
week, which confirmed that the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment 
 
 348  JUNE LANGUAGE, supra note 337, at proposed 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4). 
 349  Engelberg, supra note 20, at 396.   
 350  See PMA’s Engman and GPIA’s Haddad Will Explain Patent Restoration/ANDA 
Compromise at Rep. Kastenmeier’s Hearing June 6; PMA Endorses Bill, PINK SHEET (June 
4, 1984), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS006685 (reporting a May 31 vote 
within PMA of 22 to 12 in favor of the Waxman legislation). 
 351  See Senate Labor & Human Resources Cmte. Hearing on Patent Restoration/ANDA 
Bill Set for June 28; Waxman Proposal Clears House Commerce Cmte. June 12, PINK SHEET, 
June 18, 1984 (“Waxman asked ‘unanimous consent’ that the compromise amendment be 
considered as read, and then plunged into an explanation of the legislation before Luken could 
make a point of order assertion. Dingell then ruled that Luken had not made his point of order 
in a timely manner, and then cmte. quickly proceeded to the vote. Only Rep. Bliley (R-Va.) 
voted no.”).  
 352  H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt.1, at 76 (1984) (minority views of Mr. Bliley); see also id. at 
76 (“We do this institution a disservice by hastily reporting on the very day of introduction, a 
complex bill outside the expertise of the Committee after a ‘markup’ that lasted barely thirty 
minutes.”). 
 353  Innovation and Patent Law Reform, supra note 201, at 385–404. 
 354  Id. at 423–513. 
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protects some testing data submitted to federal regulators.355  The Senate 
Committee on Labor and Human Resources held a brief hearing on June 28, 
with a few of the same witnesses.356  Supporters of the legislation, including 
the generic trade association, emphasized that the compromise was 
“delicate” and should not be dismantled.357 
Few changes were made in the summer.  Arguments that the legislation 
reflected a delicate “balance” held sway, given the time pressures.358  In July, 
for instance, the House Judiciary subcommittee rejected—on party lines—
the Patent Office’s proposal to replace the later-issued patents restriction 
with an outer limit of expiry twenty-five years after the first patent 
application.359  The subcommittee also rejected a proposal that retroactive 
application of the experimental use exception be a condition of patent term 
restoration.360  All proposed amendments failed, except a proposal to delete 
animal drugs from the bill—these patent owners now had more favorable 
treatment in a freestanding bill.361  The full House Judiciary Committee 
reported the bill on July 31, with one minor amendment.362  A vote in the 
House was scheduled for the week of August 6.363 
The Senate Judiciary Committee had not yet marked up the Senate 
version of the bill.  In this first week of August, with adjournment for the 
Republican Convention looming, Representative Waxman and Senator 
Hatch brokered a handful of additional and more significant changes.364  The 
ten dissenting drug companies had argued, with academic support, that the 
experimental use provision would be an uncompensated taking of private 
property.365  To ensure their support of this potentially unconstitutional 
 
 355  Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991–93, 1012–13 (1984). 
 356  Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Hearing on S.2748 
Before the Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 98th Cong. 18 (1984).  The FDA testified at this 
hearing. 
 357  Innovation and Patent Law Reform, supra note 201, at 422 (Rep. Sawyer: “I was just 
going to say, in the 8 years that I have been here, I have never seen a compromise that wasn’t 
a delicately balanced compromise, which is code for ‘Keep your damn hands off it.’”  Mr. 
Haddad: “Well put.  Well put.”). 
 358  Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 546. 
 359  Id. at 545–46 (all Democrats opposed). 
 360  Id. at 545. 
 361  Id. at 546.  
 362  Id.  
 363  Id. 
 364  See Engelberg, supra note 20, at 405; Shuler, supra note 194, at 29–30; Alan D. 
Lourie, A Political History of Patent Term Restoration Part II, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, 
Feb. 1985, at 52. 
 365  Innovation and Patent Law Reform, supra note 201, at 437–43; see id. at 513–22 
(testimony and written statement of Professor Dorsen); id. at 721–38 (analysis of Professor 
Monaghan); see also Engelberg, supra note 20, at 405 (noting that Professor Tribe concluded 
the provision was unconstitutional). 
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provision, the drafters eliminated the patent term restoration limitation to 
first-issued patents.366  Although it would never be possible to achieve a 
seventeen-year patent term, it might now be possible to reach fourteen years 
with a continuation patent.367  Responding, in part, to arguments about the 
constitutionality of using innovator data grounded in the Monsanto ruling, 
the drafters also delayed generic applicant reliance on these data for five 
years after FDA approval of a new chemical entity.368  They also added a 
separability provision.369 
The patent litigation provisions were similarly the subject of intense 
negotiation until the very end.370  The legislation created an artificial act of 
infringement, giving the companies an opportunity to obtain certainty about 
infringement (and any defense of invalidity) before generic market launch.371  
It also provided incentives for generic companies to engage in this premarket 
litigation.  The first generic company to challenge an innovator’s patent (by 
arguing that its product did not infringe or that the patent was invalid) was 
eligible for 180 days of exclusivity in the marketplace.372  If the innovator’s 
drug was a new chemical entity, any generic company that challenged the 
patent could file four years—rather than five years—after NDA approval.373  
The legislation also encouraged the innovator—if the innovator converted 
this challenge promptly into litigation, FDA approval of the generic drug 
would be stayed for a fixed period of time (or until a court decision, if the 
decision came first).374  In the final negotiations of August 1984, this 
automatic stay was lengthened from eighteen months to thirty months, which 
counsel for Public Citizen viewed as a “major give” to the patent owners.375 
 
 
 
 366  See Engelberg, supra note 20, at 404–05.  
 367  As explained, a continuation patent could issue later — perhaps within a few years of 
FDA approval.  Because the patent term was seventeen years from patent issuance, this patent 
would also expire later.  As noted, this language imposed a fourteen-year limit on effective 
patent life.  Thus the patent owner could use restoration to extend the patent until fourteen 
years after FDA approval. 
 368  S. 2926, 98th Cong. (introduced Aug. 9, 1984) (proposed 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(4)(D)((ii)); 130 CONG. REC. 23,769 (Aug. 10, 1984); Lourie, supra note 364, at 54. 
 369  Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 547; Engelberg, supra note 20, at 406. 
 370  Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 547. 
 371  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (1984). 
 372  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1984). 
 373  § 355(j)(4)(D)(ii). 
 374  § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 375  Email from William B. Schultz (May 12, 2018).  Rep. Waxman characterized this 
change as pivotal. 130 CONG. REC. 24,410, 24,430 (1984) (“The change from 18 to 30 months 
was a change that brought on the dissident groups within the PMA and has brought us to a 
package now that we can say with confidence is opposed by no one and backed by all of the 
groups concerned . . . .”).   
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The parties reached agreement in the final hour before the language had 
to be introduced.376  Senator Hatch introduced the new language on August 
9, and the Senate passed the bill on August 10.377  The House made several 
changes, including removal of the separability provision, passing the bill by 
a vote of 362 to 0 on September 6.378  The Senate approved the House 
language by voice vote on September 12.379  President Reagan signed on 
September 24.380 
D. Splinter Legislation 
Curiously, during this same time period Congress enacted four 
additional laws restoring specific patents for companies regulated by the 
FDA and USDA.  The failed Kastenmeier bill had covered one of these 
situations.  The Hatch-Waxman bill covered a third until the House made its 
final set of changes. 
In January 1983, Congress restored nearly six years to the patent 
covering the food additive aspartame.381  Had it passed, the Kastenmeier bill 
would have provided the company relief.382  Approval of the patent owner’s 
petition had been delayed while the FDA considered data integrity issues 
raised by a third party.383  A review of the facts gives off a slight whiff of 
 
 376  See Shuler, supra note 194, at 29–30 (“Finally there were 20 minutes left to introduce 
the bill into the Senate before the end of that session. ‘Hatch made his point of view very 
clear . . . .  Then he left the room.’ . . .  Kennedy and Hatch literally ran the bill to the Senate 
floor at about 2 a.m.”).  Rep. Kastenmeier later derided the final language from the Senate as 
a “backroom deal in the Senate involving the chief executive officer of one of the dissenting 
drug companies and a lobbyist of one of the generic groups.”  130 CONG. REC. 24,428 (1984). 
 377  S. 2926, 98th Cong. (1984); 130 CONG. REC. 23,764–23,774 (1984). 
 378  Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 549; 130 CONG. REC. 24,416–24,458 (1984). 
 379  Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 548–49. 
 380  Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
 381  Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 11, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 155 (2011)).  
 382  S. 255, 97th Cong. (1981) (proposed § 155(c)(4)) (“[F]or products approved and for 
which a stay of regulation granting approval pursuant to section 409 of the [FDCA] was in 
effect as of January 1, 1981, the period of such patent extension shall be measured from the 
date such stay was imposed until such proceedings are finally resolved and commercial 
marketing permitted”). 
 383  Searle submitted its food additive petition in February 1973, and the FDA published a 
regulation approving the first uses of this ingredient in July 1974.  39 Fed. Reg. 27,317 (July 
26, 1974).  After objections to the approval, Searle voluntarily withheld the product from the 
market while the FDA conducted a hearing before its new Public Board of Inquiry.  Patent 
Term Restoration Act of 1981: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and 
the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 424–25 (July 22, 
September 30, October 1, 7, November 5, 12, and 18, 1981) (statement of John E. Robson, 
Executive Vice President, G.D. Searle 7 Co.) [hereafter ROBSON STATEMENT].  Meanwhile, 
concerns arose about the integrity of data generated for Searle by a contract laboratory, so the 
FDA stayed the effective date of the regulation.  40 Fed. Reg. 56,907 (Dec. 5, 1975).  An 
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mishandling by the FDA, at least during the final three years of delay.384  
“Delays of this type,” the company argued, “especially when a perishable 
commodity like patent life is in the balance . . . go beyond the bounds of 
reason or excuse.”385  Section 155 of the Patent Act described the situation 
in general terms, and required that any patent encompassing the composition 
of matter or process of using the composition in such a situation be extended 
by the amount of time from the stay of the food additive regulation 
(authorizing market entry) until the FDA finally permitted commercial 
marketing.386 
In addition, in 1983, Congress restored five years and three months to 
two patents covering Forane (isoflurane), a halogenated inhalation anesthetic 
used for surgery.387  The drug was ready for approval in 1976, but the FDA 
issued a non-approvable letter after a study in mice performed by a 
researcher at the Veterans Administration suggested the drug might be 
carcinogenic and teratogenic.388  Further investigation revealed that the mice 
had been contaminated with polybrominated biphenyls,389 and the FDA 
approved the application in December 1979.390  It cleared the manufacturing 
facility for operation in May 1981.391  The patent had issued in 1970, 
however, and the Senate sponsors explained that “because of an egregiously 
long approval process demanded by the Food and Drug Administration, only 
a small part of the seventeen-year patent term to which the company was 
entitled was effectively available to them.”392  The “hardship” had been 
 
independent organization of academic scientists confirmed the authenticity of the data in late 
1978. ROBSON STATEMENT, supra, at 427.  Because the stay had been based on data integrity 
concerns, this should have ended the matter.  The FDA still declined to lift the stay for three 
more years, however, insisting on the hearing.  See 46 Fed. Reg. 38,285 (July 24, 1981). 
 384  See generally supra note 383.  
 385  ROBSON STATEMENT, supra note 383, at 427.  
 386  Searle held one patent on the use of aspartame as a sweetener (U.S. Patent No. 
3,492,131) and assured Congress that it was not aware of other patents captured by the 
language.  ROBSON STATEMENT, supra note 383, at 424, 433.  In the end, however, PTO 
extended 32 patents.  See PTO, Patent Terms Extended Under 35 U.S.C. § 155.  Rich Cooper, 
who had been chief counsel at the FDA during this process, commented later that this resulted 
from “poor draftsmanship.”  Rich Cooper, Legislative Patent Extensions, 48 FOOD & DRUG 
L. J. 59, 65 n.32 (1993). 
 387  Pub. L. 98-127, 97 Stat. 831 (1983).  
 388  Thomas H. Corbett, Cancer and Congenital Anomalies Associated with Anesthetics, 
271 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 58, 58 (1976); see also 129 CONG. REC. 11,509 (1983) (remarks of 
Senator East). 
 389  Bijan K. Basak, Isoflurane as a General Anesthetic: Will it Displace All Other Volatile 
Anesthetics, 21 ANESTHESIOLOGY 614 (1984); 129 CONG. REC. at 11,509 (Senator East); 35 
U.S.C. § 155A (1983).  
 390  Approval Letter (NDA 17-624) (Dec. 18, 1979). 
 391  129 CONG. REC. at 11509 (Senator East).  
 392  Id. (remarks of Senator Thurmond).  
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“unfair.”393  Section 155A of the Patent Act restored the time from the initial 
non-approvable letter in 1976 to removal of the final regulatory impediment 
in 1981.394  The proposal was uncontroversial and enjoyed bipartisan 
support.395 
On the day that President Reagan signed the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments, Congress passed a private bill restoring patents that protected 
Micronase (glyburide), Diabeta (glyburide), and Glucotrol (glipizide), which 
were all second generation sulfonylurea drugs intended for management of 
diabetes.396  The FDA had found the drugs safe and effective in 1974, which 
should have resulted in approval.  The agency delayed final approval letters, 
however, while it considered whether to require new safety language in the 
labeling of all oral hypoglycemic drugs.397  The agency finally settled on 
class labeling for sulfonylurea drugs in April 1984, and approved the second 
generation drugs in May 1984.398  During these ten years, however, the first 
generation sulfonylurea drugs had remained on the market with the previous 
labeling in place.399  The final Hatch-Waxman legislation passed by the 
Senate on August 10 included separate language restoring these patents,400 
but the House removed it after the August recess when it removed the 
separability provision.401  Congress passed a private bill one month later, 
extending five patents until April 21, 1992, which added about five years to 
each and resulted in an effective patent life of roughly eight years.402 
 
 393  Id. (remarks of Senator East).  
 394  35 U.S.C. § 155A (1984).  
 395  129 CONG. REC. at 11,509 (Senator Thurmond). 
 396  Priv. L. No. 98-46, 98 Stat. 3434 (1984); see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-1060 (1984) (text 
of private bill), reprinted in PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION, supra note 120, at 75.  
 397  The labeling issue stemmed from a controversial study assessing the effectiveness of 
four other oral hypoglycemic drugs, which found an association between the drugs and 
increased cardiovascular mortality.  See Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 410 (1st Cir. 1973).  
Many diabetes specialists believed the study flawed, however, because of deficiencies in trial 
design and statistical analysis, and the FDA struggled to interpret the findings.  CURTIS 
MEINERT, THE TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY GROUP DIABETES PROGRAM 91–
107 (2015) (describing the reaction in the media and scientific journals); Oral Hypoglycemic 
Drugs ‘Reported’ Association with Cardiovascular Death Will Be Required in Labeling for 
Class of Agents, FDA Final Rule States, PINK SHEET, Apr. 16, 1984 (summarizing the “14-
year debate over how the FDA should handle the UGDP findings”). 
 398  PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION, supra note 120, at 8–9 (statement of Mark Rogart); see 
also Labeling for Oral Hypoglycemic Drugs of the Sulfonylurea Class, 49 Fed. Reg. 14,303 
(Apr. 11, 1984) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 310) (requiring cardiovascular warning 
in labeling of oral hypoglycemic drugs because of the study). 
 399  PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION, supra note 120, at 9.  
 400  See 130 CONG. REC. at 23,773 (proposed 35 U.S.C. § 155A). 
 401  Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 548–49.  The House simply never considered this 
Title.  See 130 CONG. REC. at 24,416–24,458 (1984). 
 402  H.R. REP. NO. 98-1060 (1984) (text of private bill), reprinted in PRIVATE PATENT 
LEGISLATION, supra note 120, at 12, 75.  
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Finally, in October 1984, Congress restored a patent claiming a sterile 
solid whey blend used to increase milk production in cows.403  Impro 
Products had submitted its application to the Veterinary Biologics Division 
(VBD) of the Department of Agriculture in 1965, and VBD issued a special 
two-year license allowing the company to conduct field tests in support of a 
permanent license.404  A scientist in another agency persuaded VBD to delay 
the permanent license for six months while he ran tests.405  What followed 
was both irregular and improper.  The scientist released his conclusion—that 
the whey blend did not significantly improve milk production—before 
finishing his tests.406  After the study results were rejected for publication, 
the scientist overcame the rejection by hand-delivering a copy of the 
manuscript to the President of the American Veterinary Medical 
Association, whom he persuaded to insist on publication.407  VBD refused to 
share his data, even when pressed by a member of Congress.408  When Impro 
finally secured the raw data, it became clear that the scientist’s team had not 
followed its own written protocols.409  By the time Impro came to Congress 
seeking relief, a district court had found that the study report contained false 
and misleading statements.410  Still, the company did not have approval.411  
The USDA and the Department of Justice opposed relief for this reason; the 
product had not yet been found effective.412  The Commissioner of Patents, 
in contrast, supported relief.413  The Senate Judiciary Committee, which 
assumed the product would not receive approval before patent expiry in 
April 1985, concluded that a new seventeen-year patent term was 
appropriate, “based on the fact that due to unjustified government 
 
 403  Priv. L. No. 98-34, 98 Stat. 3430 (1984).  Secondary accounts sometimes identify the 
product as “Impro,” but Impro was the manufacturer.  The product was known as Whey Blend. 
 404  H.R. REP. NO. 98-1061 (1984), reprinted in PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION, supra note 
120, at 83. 
 405  Id. 
 406  PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION, supra note 120, at 83; see J.W. Smith et al., Whey 
Antibody Preparation: Effects of Prepartum Injection on Milk Production in Dairy Cows, 31 
AM. J. VETERINARY RES. 1485 (1970). 
 407  Id. 
 408  Id. 
 409  Id. 
 410  Impro Prods., Inc. v. Block, 722 F.2d 845, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing Impro 
Products, Inc. v. Block, No. 81-1284 (D.D.C. Sept. 2, 1982) (Memorandum and Order)). 
 411  PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION, supra note 120, at 80.  The company had been able to 
market within its home state of Iowa; this did not involve interstate commerce, which deprived 
the USDA of jurisdiction.  See id. at 30. 
 412  Id. at 62 (memorandum from the Department of Agriculture explaining that Impro had 
neither submitted data to contradict the report’s basic conclusion nor submitted its own 
efficacy data to justify a permanent approval). 
 413  Id. 
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involvement, Impro ha[d] never been allowed an opportunity to exploit its 
patent.”414  The House settled on fifteen years, reasoning that the company 
had enjoyed two years of field testing under the special license.415 
IV. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN 
AMENDMENTS 
The high water mark for patent term restoration legislation lasted from 
July 1981 (passage of the Kastenmeier bill by the Senate) until September 
1982 (rejection of the bill by the House, despite majority support).  Drug 
patent owners supported patent term restoration because it would lengthen 
their effective patent life and increase their revenues.  Rather than simply 
arguing that restoration was in their economic interests, however, they 
grounded the justification in concerns about incentives to innovate.  In other 
words, they invoked the public’s interest in a continuing supply of new 
treatments. Academic economists bolstered these utilitarian arguments.  By 
and large, patent owners eschewed arguments about compensation for 
sacrificed patent time and about ensuring equal treatment (outcomes) for all 
types of patent owners, leaving others (such as the PTO) to make these 
arguments. 
Patent owners in other regulated industries supported patent term 
restoration for the same reason—it would lengthen their effective patent 
life—and made the same arguments—mainly utilitarian.  These other patent 
owners were fairly engaged in the legislative push through the late 1970s 
into the early 1980s.416  When the generic industry engaged fully and the 
policy debate turned to drug patents and drug prices, these patent owners 
engaged less and often engaged separately.  When Waxman released the 
generic drug bill in April 1984, many patent owners broke off, realizing that 
the prospects for patent term restoration had diminished considerably 
because of joinder with drug pricing issues. 
By the late 1970s, the FDA had fully joined the innovating companies 
in supporting patent term restoration, citing the length of premarket 
programs, shortened effective patent life, and concerns about incentives to 
innovate.  As late as spring 1982, the agency held the view that innovators 
should have seventeen years of effective exclusivity.  The agency 
experienced several rapid changes in leadership during this period: two 
Democrat-appointed Commissioners between introduction of the first patent 
term restoration bill in April 1979 and January 1981, and two Republican-
 
 414  Id. at 80. 
 415  Id. at 81. 
 416  E.g., The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 59 (1981) (testimony of various individuals from the pesticide 
industry).  
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appointed Commissioners between January 1981 and enactment of the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments in fall 1984.417  Still, the FDA remained fairly 
consistent in its views.  The agency was well aware that its statute, programs, 
and policies were seen as responsible for the shortened effective patent life.  
It may have viewed patent term restoration as a way to protect its new and 
increasingly robust premarket research and development paradigm.  This, in 
turn, might reflect a technocratic commitment to the premarket model that 
the agency helped to develop, or an effort to protect the agency’s reputation 
and role in the economy. 
PTO’s support for patent term restoration was mostly unqualified, even 
during the Carter years, and its continuously strong support after Reagan 
took office probably reflected the new Administration’s policy objectives.  
Beginning in 1982, the Commissioner of Patents was also an Under-
Secretary of Commerce, and was thus closely connected to both the White 
House and the Reagan Administration’s policy initiatives to foster 
innovation in industry.  The PTO tended to argue from the economic theory 
of the patent and the role of patents in stimulating innovative behavior.  The 
Office also focused on equal treatment of patent owners.  For instance, the 
Commissioner of Patents commented repeatedly that it would be “unfair” to 
establish a different patent term for a highly profitable industry.418  The 
Office also tended to focus broadly on all patents shortened by premarket 
regulatory requirements, rather than specifically on drug patents.  Indeed, 
despite supporting an outer limit on the effective life of restored continuation 
patents, PTO was firmly committed to restoration of every affected patent 
covering a regulated product. 
Despite PTO’s emphasis on ensuring all patentees enjoyed equal patent 
rights and on compensating for sacrificed time, the innovative industry’s 
arguments about ensuring adequate incentives for innovation had more 
traction in Congress.  This may explain why the petroleum industry was 
rebuffed.  Although the bills proposing patent term restoration between 1979 
and 1984 varied in their approach, they generally included the full range of 
products subject to premarket review: medical devices, animal drugs, food 
 
 417  These were Donald Kennedy (April 1979 to June 1979), Jere Goyan (October 1979 to 
January 1981), Arthur Hayes (April 1981 to September 1983), and Frank Young (July 1984 
to December 1989).  See FDA, Commissioners, https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/History/ 
FOrgsHistory/Leaders/ucm2006081.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2018). 
 418  E.g., PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION, supra note 120, at 17; Innovation and Patent Law 
Reform, supra note 201, at 46 (“They have pointed to high profit margins of industries which 
would benefit from this type of legislation and have concluded that, as a consequence, there 
is no problem.  I would suggest that it would be clearly unfair to establish different effective 
patent terms depending on the potential economic success of a particular sector of 
technology.”).  
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and color additives, pesticides, and new chemicals.419  In contrast, there was 
never any possibility that the legislation would include the petroleum 
industry.420  These companies had argued that environmental regulations 
delay the opening of refineries, precluding enjoyment of patents claiming 
catalysts used in the refining process.421  Judge Lourie explained in 1984 why 
legislators declined their request for restoration.422 The companies were not 
marketing a patented product subject to premarket review, and the key 
business decision—whether to build a refinery—would not be influenced by 
the length of patent protection for the catalyst.423  The patent term legislation 
was grounded in testimony and empirical evidence that patent term distortion 
affected commercialization decisions.  The legislation was intended to 
restore the commercialization incentive by repairing the distortion, but if the 
connection between effective patent life and the desired business decision 
was lacking, there was no basis for restoration. 
Patent owners, joined by the PTO, the FDA, and academic economists, 
argued that the public would benefit from the Kastenmeier legislation 
through an increase in innovation.  Others, however, argued that the public 
would bear the costs of the legislation—at least with respect to drug 
patents—because a delay in generic drug entry meant consumers would pay 
more for a medicine for a longer period of time.  Public Citizen made this 
argument for the public, leading to a clash in arguments about where the 
public’s interest lay.  PTO took the opposite view: increased prices would be 
offset by the development of new products.424  The generic drug companies 
made a variety of arguments, such as questioning the need for restoration, 
but they too were focused on the harm to the public.  These companies were 
acting out of self-interest as much as the patent owners were, as patent term 
restoration would delay their market entry, but they invoked social welfare 
arguments and thus aligned their advocacy with that of Public Citizen. 
A variety of explanations have been offered for the failure of the bill in 
September 1982.  The bill would have passed, had it not been placed on the 
suspension calendar.425  Supporters may have been overconfident.  In 
 
 419  For instance, as previously discussed, the Kastenmeier proposals applied to any 
product subject to federal premarket regulatory review.  See generally Section III.A.1. 
 420  Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 529. 
 421  Id. 
 422  Id.  
 423  Id. 
 424  The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 40 (1981) (testimony of Rene D. Tegtmeyer) (“Whatever effects it 
might have, in terms of increasing drug prices, if that does occur to any extent, I think would 
be more than offset by a return in the form of making available to the public many new drugs 
or pharmaceuticals, many new pesticides, and other new products.”). 
 425  As previously noted, a majority of the House voted for passage.  See supra Section 
III.A.4. 
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addition, several members of the House who likely would have supported 
the bill were not present to vote, and at least one account suggests their 
flights were delayed by airport fog.426 There is, however, a deeper 
explanation for its failure.  The generic companies had coalesced as a group 
around the issue of patent term restoration, forming a new trade association 
under a leader who had an influential voice in Washington policymaking 
circles.  During the winter of 1981 to 1982, the generic industry’s voice grew 
stronger, and it continued to focus policymakers on the pricing impact of 
patent term restoration.  Pricing arguments may have been particularly 
compelling to members concerned about reelection, because prescription 
drugs were generally not covered by public or private health insurance.427 
The tide turned when the generic companies shifted to seeking 
affirmative changes in the law, rather than merely opposing patent term 
restoration.  The key to understanding the final legislation is understanding 
that the generic companies did not simply seek policies that would have to 
be married with, or reconciled with, policies sought by patent owners.  
Instead, they sought precisely the opposite policy outcome.  Drug patent 
owners wanted longer exclusivity in the market through longer effective 
patent life.  The generic companies wanted drug patent owners to have 
shorter exclusivity in the market. 
The tide turned in 1982 and 1983, in particular, because the generic 
industry suffered a series of policymaking defeats in those years that 
prevented them from achieving this policy outcome through other means.  
An administrative proposal to permit these companies to file ANDAs 
withered on the vine in March 1982, and the Supreme Court decided the 
same month it would consider whether they could bring generic drugs to 
market without testing and without submitting applications.428  A federal 
court ruled in July 1982 that they could not test their generic products during 
the patent term.429  The fact that they pressed hard in August and September 
1982 to oppose the Kastenmeier patent term restoration bill now makes 
sense.  In March 1983, the possibility of bringing generic drugs to market as 
old drugs without marketing applications evaporated with the Supreme 
 
 426  Lourie, History, Summary, and Appraisal, supra note 24, at 354. 
 427  See Thomas Oliver et al., A Political History of Medicare and Prescription Drug 
Coverage, 82 MILBANK Q. 283, 293 (2004) (noting that prescription drug coverage was 
limited both for Medicare beneficiaries and for patients insured through private insurance 
companies).  Congress did not add an outpatient prescription drug benefit for Medicare 
beneficiaries until 2003.  Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, 
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
 428  United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 455 U.S. 988 (1982). 
 429  Pfizer, Inc. v. Int’l Rectifier Corp., No. 73-58, 1982 WL 51039 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 
1982). 
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Court’s Generix ruling.430 
With these policymaking defeats, the generic drug companies now 
sought a policy outcome that was exactly the opposite of the outcome sought 
by the innovators.  They wanted an exception to infringement so they could 
develop and test their copies during the patent term, and they wanted to rely 
on the safety and effectiveness data generated by patent owners.  These 
policy changes would shorten the effective exclusivity of innovative drugs 
in the market.  The generic drug companies turned to Waxman for support, 
and he introduced generic drug legislation shortly after. 
Because the two sides sought directly conflicting policy outcomes, it is 
a bit odd to speak of a compromise in which each side benefitted.  Unless 
the law was a wash, the possible outcomes were binary.  Either the patent 
owners would on the whole have more time before generic competition, or 
they would have less. 
With this in mind, the final legislation can be examined—considering 
each industry before and after enactment.  The discussion that follows is not 
meant to be normative, nor does it make claims about the relative allocation 
of benefits and costs under the scheme as it stands today (as amended by 
Congress and as interpreted by the FDA and the courts).  Rather, it is a 
historically contextualized assessment of the benefits and costs in September 
1984, considering the state of the law as it stood the day before and the day 
after enactment. 
Patent owners came to the table with a problem—a loss of effective 
patent life because of federal regulatory requirements.  They emerged with 
some of this loss mitigated, and in this respect they benefited from the 
legislation.  In the process, however, they lost the right to enforce their 
patents while competitors manufactured and tested infringing products.  The 
lead negotiator for the generic industry association explains that patent term 
restoration and the experimental use provision were “self-canceling” and 
“taken together, have no net effect on the length of the exclusive marketing 
period of most new drugs.”431  In addition, patent owners lost exclusivity in 
their testing data five years after approval.432  Many refer to the five-year 
period as a benefit the innovative companies received in the legislation, but 
this is incorrect as a historical matter.433  There was no pathway for approval 
of applications relying on innovator data before Reagan signed the statute on 
September 24.  The legislation removed all but five years of the data 
 
 430  United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453 (1983). 
 431  Engelberg, supra note 20, at 392. 
 432  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(D)((ii) (1984). 
 433  See Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 103–10 
(2016). 
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exclusivity the patent owners had enjoyed before.434 
The generic drug companies came to the table with a different problem: 
they were subject to the same regulatory requirements as everyone else, 
meaning they were required to conduct clinical trials and file full 
applications.  In addition, they were subject to the intellectual property rights 
of others—patent rights and the FDA’s treatment of testing data as trade 
secrets.  They emerged still subject to the patent and, indeed, the patent 
would be a few years—but never more than five years—longer.  They could, 
however, develop and test their products during the patent term, saving them 
three to five years.435  As the lead lawyer for the generic companies 
explained, these provisions cancelled each other out.436  Now, however, they 
could also rely on the patent owner’s testing data in their marketing 
applications, saving them several years and the expensive of clinical testing. 
This leaves the patent litigation provisions.  Although some 
characterize these provisions as benefiting the patent owners, a historically 
contextualized reading suggests they were at most a wash and may have 
benefitted the generic industry.  The key is that they cannot be considered in 
the abstract; they must be read with the remaining patent provisions of the 
statute—the experimental use exception, the artificial act of infringement, 
and patent term restoration.  The impact can be illustrated best with 
hypotheticals. 
Assume the administrative burdens are comparable.  The patent owner 
must list its patents in its application, and the generic applicant must address 
those patents in its own application and send a letter to the innovator.  
Assume these are a wash.  To simplify the analysis, also assume there is only 
one patent, and assume the innovative product is a new chemical entity.  In 
order to draw a comparison, assume further that (1) the effective patent life, 
without restoration, is nine years; (2) the generic company needed six years 
to prepare an application before enactment and would need four years to 
prepare an application after enactment; (3) the innovator enjoys the 
maximum five years of patent term restoration; and (4) the FDA takes two 
years to review and approve a generic application both before and after 
enactment.  In other words, assume a small benefit from the law for the 
generic company (no more than two years shaven off the application process) 
 
 434  The myth that innovators received five years in this legislation may stem from the fact 
that the June draft permitted copies immediately after NDA approval.  The five-year provision 
was added in August.  But when one compares the final enacted law with the state of the law 
before enactment, there can be no dispute that NDA holders lost all but five years of 
exclusivity. 
 435  As explained in Section III.C., supra, previously generic companies seeking to market 
copies of post-1962 innovative products were required to perform clinical trials and to submit 
full new drug applications. 
 436  Engelberg, supra note 20, at 392. 
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and the maximum benefit from the law for the innovator (maximum patent 
term restoration). 
Consider first a scenario in which the generic company chooses not to 
challenge the patent.  Under the law of September 23, before enactment, this 
company waited for the patent to expire (nine years), developed and studied 
its drug (six years), and waited for approval (two years).  The generic 
company would reach the market seventeen years after the innovator.  After 
enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, this company could develop 
and study its drug (for four years) and wait for FDA approval (for two years) 
during the patent term.  It could submit its ANDA five years after the 
innovative drug approval, and the FDA would approve the ANDA when the 
patent expired—at nine years plus five years patent term restoration.  The 
generic company would reach the market fourteen years after the innovator.  
The generic company’s position improved with the enactment of the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments.  If the patent owner did not receive the full five years 
of patent term restoration, of course, the generic company’s position after 
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments would be even more favorable. 
Consider second a scenario in which the generic company chooses to 
challenge the validity of the patent.  Assume also that it decides to start 
developing its copy immediately after FDA approval of the innovative 
product.  Under the law of September 23, this company—believing the 
patent invalid—did not wait for the patent to expire.  Immediately after FDA 
approval of the innovative product, it developed and studied its copy (six 
years) and waited for FDA approval (two years).  But it took these steps at 
risk, because there was no experimental use exception.  It would reach the 
market eight years after the innovator and would then face immediate patent 
infringement litigation and possible damages for infringement.  After 
enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, this company would still 
begin work immediately.  It would develop and study its drug (four years) 
and file the ANDA immediately.  The statute permits a generic company to 
file an application with a patent challenge four years after FDA approval of 
the innovator’s drug.437  The FDA can take two years or more to review the 
generic application,438 but this is mostly beside the point because, if the 
 
 437  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2018). 
 438  The FDA’s current goal is to review and act on 90 percent of standard original ANDAs 
within 10 months of their submission date.  See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GDUFA 
REAUTHORIZATON PERFORMANCE GOALS AND PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS FISCAL YEARS 
2018–2022, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/ 
GenericDrugUserFees/UCM525234.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2018).  In the first three quarters 
of 2018 the average time to a tentative approval was 33 months, 21 months, and 31 months.  
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ACTIVITIES REPORT OF THE GENERIC DRUGS PROGRAM (FY 
2018)–GDUFA II QUARTERLY PERFORMANCE, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou 
/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/GenericDrugs/ucm600678.htm (last visited Oct. 
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innovator brings a timely suit, the statute precludes approval of the generic 
drug until seven and a half years after the innovator’s drug.439  Thus, the 
generic company would reach the market seven and a half years after the 
innovator.  In the meantime, it would have been litigating the patent case.  
So it would reach the market sooner and have an opportunity to test its theory 
of invalidity without risking infringement damages.  The generic company’s 
position improved with enactment of Hatch-Waxman. 
Some characterize the thirty-month delay of approval in the event of 
patent litigation as tantamount to a statutorily imposed preliminary 
injunction.440  The patent owner, after all, benefits from an automatic stay of 
approval, without having to make the showings needed for a preliminary 
injunction.441  Perhaps the patent owner would not have won a preliminary 
injunction if it had gone to court before the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, 
though the courts were generous with preliminary injunctions.442  In such a 
situation, one could say that the generic company is now (after enactment) 
barred from the market for thirty months despite not infringing, though it 
would not have been barred before the statute was passed.  The generic drug 
companies, however, told Representative Waxman that, as a practical matter, 
they would generally wait for a court decision before launching a potentially 
infringing product.443  Representative Waxman cited this fact in defense of 
the thirty-month stay.444  Moreover, this characterization overlooks the rest 
of the scheme.  That is, if the statute had not passed, the generic company 
would have filed a full new drug application, after performing its own 
clinical trials.  Thus, the entire timeline would have been shifted later, and 
the generic company would have launched later. 
A generic company challenging an innovator patent might not file its 
ANDA at the four-year mark.  The statute included the 180-day exclusivity 
incentive for the first to challenge a patent, however, which would tend to 
lead to submission at the four-year mark.  In the interests of completeness, 
 
24, 2018).  The FDA issues “tentative approval” when an ANDA review of the application is 
complete and the application satisfies the statutory approval standard, but the agency cannot 
grant final approval (giving permission to market the drug) due to a patent or regulatory 
exclusivity.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(dd)(AA). 
 439  § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii). 
 440  E.g., Eisenberg, supra note 58, at 358.  
 441  Id. 
 442  E.g., M.A. Cunningham, Preliminary Injunctive Relief in Patent Litigation, 35 IDEA: 
J. L. & TECH. 213, 231 (1995) (finding that courts granted preliminary injunctions in 61 
percent of patent cases between October 1, 1982, and December 31, 1993). 
 443  130 CONG. REC. 24,427 (1984) (remarks of Rep. Waxman) (“The facts of life are that 
a generic drug manufacturer will await, as a practical matter, until the decision of a court on 
a patent challenge before that manufacturer markets a generic drug.  That is the information 
they have given us as to their practice.”). 
 444  Id. 
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assume that it instead chose to file at the seven-year mark.  In this situation, 
the numbers would change.  If the innovator brought a timely suit, the statute 
would preclude approval for thirty more months, until roughly nine and a 
half years after the innovator.  In this case, the generic drug company would 
enter the market later than it would have entered the market (at the eight-
year mark) before enactment, but this would happen only if the generic 
company delayed submission several years—not if it filed at the earliest 
possible opportunity, which presumably it would do, if it thought the patent 
invalid and wanted 180-day exclusivity. 
One reader of this paper in draft form commented that the benefit to the 
patent owner from the patent provisions (and 30-month stay in particular) is 
meaningful, unless one assumes that all patents are valid.  The benefit 
accrues to the patent owner, she remarked, whether or not the patent is valid, 
and whether or not the patent is infringed.  This is correct, as far as it goes, 
but the question is not whether the patent provisions of the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments contain isolated provisions benefitting the patent owner.  
Undoubtedly they do.  They also contain isolated provisions benefitting the 
generic applicant, such as the experimental use exception and the prospect 
of 180-day exclusivity.  The question is whether drug patent owners (and 
generic companies) were in a better or worse position after enactment than 
before enactment.  This question must be answered by looking at the scheme 
as a whole.445 
On the whole, the new law made generic companies better off, and it 
made patent owners worse off.446  But the innovative industry’s trade 
association testified in support of the Hatch-Waxman legislation in June 
1984.  One might ask why the association did so if the legislation would so 
 
 445  Professor Sachs contends that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments expanded patentee 
rights.  Sachs, supra note 20, at 396.  In her view, the two industries would have little difficulty 
“coming together to lobby for this statute,” given its concentrated benefits, and the “public 
choice collective action problem”—in which the diffuse public would be unable to prevent 
enactment—was “more exaggerated” than had been the case when Congress enacted the 
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 and the Bayh-Dole Act.  Id. at 384.  Consumer 
groups might have opposed patent term extension, she writes, but would have been placated 
by the generic drug pathway.  Id.  Public choice theory, she concludes, does not fully explain 
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.  Id. at 396.  The broader legislative and regulatory climate 
and Waxman’s legislative entrepreneurship must have contributed to the enactment.  Id. at 
386–89.  Although I share her view of Waxman’s role, my review of the regulatory and 
legislative history leads to a different conclusion—that the scheme did not expand patentee 
rights, that the public had vicarious representation, and that the benefits were unilateral.  
 446  A discussion of the actual impact of the statute on the industries is beyond the scope 
of this article, but it bears mentioning that both innovating and generic companies could have 
benefitted significantly simply from the certainty that came with a final legislative resolution 
of the issues.  For one review of the empirical studies evaluating the impact of the statute on 
innovator market exclusivity, see Aaron Kesselheim, An Empirical Review of Major 
Legislation Affecting Drug Development: Past Experiences, Effects, and Unintended 
Consequences, 89 MILBANK Q. 450, 477–81 (2011). 
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clearly leave innovators in a worse position.  The answer may simply be that, 
particularly after Senator Hatch made it clear the legislation would be 
enacted, acquiescing seemed safer than the alternative.  Leadership of the 
trade association may have concluded that this was the best outcome that the 
industry could achieve.  In addition, there always remained a risk that, if the 
legislation were blocked, the FDA would resuscitate the proposed ANDA 
regulation, perhaps with a very short exclusivity period under a Democrat-
appointed Commissioner. 
In truth, though, the innovators were bitterly divided about the 
legislation.  Just as the chemical industry patent owners broke away from the 
Waxman bill, so too did the ten largest members of PMA—American Home 
Products, Bristol-Myers, Carter-Wallace, Hoffman-La Roche, Johnson & 
Johnson, Merck, Norwich Eaton (Procter & Gamble), Schering-Plough, 
Squibb, and Stuart Pharmaceuticals (ICI Americas).447  These companies 
stood to lose the most from the research use exemption, the half-hearted 
restoration formula, and immediate use of their testing data upon NDA 
approval.  They testified and lobbied through the summer of 1984, focusing 
on their objections.  With Senator Hatch’s “with you or without you” threat, 
they had little leverage, but several prominent legal scholars backed their 
argument about the constitutionality of applying the new research use 
exemption to already-issued patents.448  This, and the Monsanto decision—
which raised doubts about authorizing companies to rely on data submitted 
to the FDA with an expectation of confidentiality—gave them a foothold to 
secure last-minute changes. 
If the dynamics were so disadvantageous as to result in legislation that 
made patent owners worse off, one also has to wonder why the drafters made 
any concessions at the eleventh hour.  The last-minute concessions can be 
explained as a response to genuine concerns about constitutionality.  The 
inclusion of (admittedly weakened) patent term restoration is harder to 
explain, but it is surely relevant that the chief negotiator for the generic 
companies viewed it as a “wash” with the experimental use exception.449  It 
may also have been the price for Senator Hatch’s sponsorship of the 
legislation, making it possible to characterize the scheme as a compromise 
in which both sides received a little something. 
Finally, the splinter legislation—individual patent term restoration bills 
for three drugs, a food additive, and a veterinary biologic—may be part of 
the story.  The enactments make sense given the relative allocation of 
benefits and costs and the distraction of the broader legislative debate.  The 
 
 447  Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Hearing on S.2748 
Before the Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 98th Cong. 113–15 (1984). 
 448  See supra note 365. 
 449  Engelberg, supra note 20, at 392. 
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benefits of these bills were concentrated, and the companies who stood to 
benefit were motivated to press for passage.  In contrast, the costs of the bills 
were dispersed; they would be borne by the general public through higher 
prices during the patent terms, and the narrowness of the bills meant that the 
impact on any one member of the public would be modest.  As to each 
product, would-be competitors would also bear the cost when their market 
entry was delayed, but only companies planning to market those particular 
products would have an incentive to engage in opposition to the bill.  The 
generic drug companies and Public Citizen may have chosen to focus instead 
on battling the prospective and generally applicable patent term restoration 
language, which would shape the competitive landscape for years to come. 
There is, however, another angle to consider.  Four of the companies 
involved—Searle, Upjohn, Hoechst-Roussel, and Pfizer—were substantial 
research-based pharmaceutical companies and members of PMA.450  
Congress had resolved Searle’s situation in early 1983.451  The other three 
companies were covered by separate language specific to their situation 
included in the Hatch-Waxman legislation until the House vote in September 
1984.452  Each also chose to support the Hatch-Waxman Amendments 
through the summer of 1984.453  Handling their needs in stand-alone 
language might have prevented them from joining the dissenters and, thus, 
might have played a role in ensuring passage of the legislation.454 
The fracturing of PMA had lasting consequences for the innovative 
drug industry.  By early 1985, the leadership that urged the companies to 
accept the June deal had been replaced.  Indeed, the Commissioner of 
Patents, who had retired from his government position, assumed the 
 
 450  Time is Now for ANDA/Patent Restoration Bill, Sen. Hatch Tells PMA Firms Seeking 
Changes: Second Look by Coalition Would be Welcome, He Adds, PINK SHEET, July 2, 1984 
(listing 13 members of PMA that supported the legislation, including these three and Searle). 
 451  Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 11, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 155 (2011)). 
 452  130 CONG. REC. at 23,773 (proposed 35 U.S.C. § 155A); see also supra Section III.E. 
 453  Hoechst-Roussel, Upjohn & Pfizer Would Get Eight Year Patent Extensions for 
Second Generation Oral Hypoglycemics Under Amendment Introduced by Thurmond, PINK 
SHEET, July 9, 1984 (noting that Upjohn, Hoechst-Roussel, and Pfizer were “nominal 
supporters” of the Hatch-Waxman bill). 
 454  That this might have been a deliberate strategy to split the innovators was suggested 
to me by someone involved at the time, but two people in a position to confirm this as strategy 
were unable to recall it.  Nevertheless, twelve members of PMA opposed the legislation, and 
if these four (who presumably supported the legislation, as they were listed as supporters in 
June) had voted the other way, the vote would have been much closer—eighteen to sixteen, 
rather than twenty-two to twelve.  See PMA’s Engman and GPIA’s Haddad Will Explain 
Patent Restoration/ANDA Compromise at Rep. Kastenmeier’s Hearing June 6; PMA 
Endorses Bill, PINK SHEET (Jun. 4, 1984), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS00 
6685/ (reporting a May 31 vote within PMA of 22 to 12 in favor of the Waxman legislation). 
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presidency of PMA.455  That the generic trade association was not similarly 
bitterly divided is telling. 
This leaves the ultimate question: how did seven years of policy 
discussions and full engagement by both affected industries result in 
legislation that clearly benefitted one group rather than the other? 
The legislative process turned out the way it did because the generic 
companies benefitted from a classic “Baptists and bootleggers” alliance.  
Professor Yandle first articulated the Baptists and bootleggers theory of 
regulation in 1983.456  Both groups had vigorously supported Sunday Blue 
Laws, which closed bars and liquor stores on Sundays in southern states.457  
Baptists supported the blue laws on moral grounds, while bootleggers 
supported them for economic reasons (they had exclusive sales on 
Sundays).458  Yandle’s theory holds, in brief, that “durable social regulation 
evolves when it is demanded by both of two distinctly different groups.”459  
Baptists, he explained in 1999, “point to the moral high ground and give vital 
and vocal endorsement of laudable public benefits promised by a desired 
regulation.”460  Bootleggers, in contrast, “are simply in it for the money.”  
They “grease the political machinery with some of their expected 
proceeds.”461 
The generic companies argued that their proposed policy changes 
would increase and accelerate the supply of less expensive drugs.  They 
urged these policy changes because they would be selling the drugs in 
question and would profit from the legislation’s passage.  But, just as the 
patent owners had done with respect to patent term restoration, they invoked 
the public’s interest—here, in cheaper drugs.  As a result, they received 
strong support from the public sector, especially Public Citizen.462  The key 
 
 455  Mossinghoff Joins PMA Full-Time on Jan. 22: Stetler’s Continued Affiliation with 
Assn. Should Make FDA Learning Period and Relations with Board Easier, PINK SHEET (Dec. 
17, 1984), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS007621/. 
 456  Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists–The Education of a Regulatory Economist, 
REG., May–June 1983, at 12. 
 457  Id. 
 458  Id. 
 459  Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, REG., Fall 1999, at 5. 
 460  Id. 
 461  Id. 
 462  By way of contrast, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—which today engages in 
policymaking discussions, generally in support of measures to facilitate earlier generic drug 
entry—did not play a meaningful role in the political process that led to enactment of the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments.  It had been deeply involved in development of a model state 
law to guide generic drug substitution, but it did not engage in the discussions relating to 
patent term restoration or the generic drug bill.  The FTC did not have the reputation and 
influence then that it has today.  After a series of hostile oversight hearings in 1979 and 1980 
and unambiguous comments from members of Congress that it had “overstepped its bounds,” 
the FTC cut back on consumer protection activities and became “relatively inactive” for most 
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Public Citizen Litigation Group attorney involved in these negotiations, 
William Schultz, would eventually become a prominent lawyer for generic 
companies and, in this capacity, was deeply involved in the parallel policy 
debate from 2003 to 2010 relating to copies of biological medicines.463 
In the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, the generic 
companies played the role of the bootleggers, and Public Citizen played the 
role of the Baptists.  This alliance was particularly effective because—
whether arguing against patent term restoration or for the generic drug 
legislation (meaning the ANDA provision and the experimental use 
exception)—the generic companies had one argument, which merged their 
own economic interests (selling their wares) with the public’s interest (less 
expensive alternatives to patented products, sooner).  Representative Tom 
Kindness (R-OH) even commented during the final debate before passage in 
the House that he had “never known generic manufacturers to be clothed 
quite so heavily in the cloak of consumerism and protection of senior 
citizens” as had “been the case in the discussion” of the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments.464 
To be sure, the patent-owning companies had invoked the public’s 
interest, as well, in favor of the robust patent term restoration of the 
Kastenmeier bills, in which they had a financial interest.  The interest in 
question, however, was both distant in time and necessarily imprecise—a 
greater likelihood of unspecified new treatments in the future.  Also the PTO 
would not play the role of the Baptist to the innovating industry’s bootlegger; 
it generally leaned on the theory of the patent rather than extolling concrete 
benefits that the public would receive.  Thus, a Baptists-and-bootleggers 
alliance could not bring the patent term restoration bills over the finish line.  
Indeed, the innovative industry faced a basic problem that continues to 
challenge scholars and policymakers; it could not prove the counterfactual.  
There was no easy way to show that longer effective patent life would result 
in more approved new drugs.  Although some companies described research 
programs forsaken,465 this testimony could be dismissed as self-serving.  By 
 
of the decade.  Ross D. Petty, Reflections on My Experience with the Federal Trade 
Commission Transition in the Early 1980s, 33 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 212 (2014). 
 463  E.g., Ramsey Baghdadi, Flubbing the FOBs Opportunity: Follow-on Biologics 
Winners and Losers, PINK SHEET (Oct. 1, 2007), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com 
/PS080341/Flubbing-the-FOBs-Opportunity-Followon-Biologics-Winners—Losers.  Later 
he held significant positions in government, including as the General Counsel of Health and 
Human Services under President Obama. 
 464  130 CONG. REC. 24,437 (1984) (“They are making money off of those people.  Right?  
They are making money off of those people just as surely as the innovators who invent 
drugs.”). 
 465  E.g., Health and the Env’t Misc.—Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health 
and the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 340 (1981) (statement of 
Dr. Lewis H. Sarett) (noting that Merck had abandoned development of treatments for cystic 
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way of contrast, the short-term benefits of earlier generic drug entry and 
cheaper generic drugs were easy to describe in tangible terms and were 
indisputable, and because American voters lacked meaningful insurance 
coverage for prescription drugs, these benefits were compelling. 
Although the FDA had supported patent term restoration, addition of 
generic drug approval provisions put it in a position to support the broader 
bill.  The agency generally supported a statutory solution to the generic drug 
approval issue.  It had struggled for decades to find a lawful pathway to 
market for generic drugs, whether those drugs copied pre-1962 products or 
post-1962 products.  Although the agency had not lost a case in the Supreme 
Court within recent memory, it had suffered several bruising defeats in the 
lower courts.  These included losing to an innovator that had challenged its 
decision to allow pre-1962 generic drugs to remain on the market while the 
companies prepared ANDAs.466  By 1983, the FDA may have felt it had done 
everything it could do to facilitate generic drug access. It was publishing 
therapeutic equivalence ratings to assist states with substitution of lower cost 
generics.467  It had considered regulatory solutions, such as old drug 
monographs and ANDAs through rulemaking, but had abandoned these due 
to the specter of another court defeat.  It had proposed legislation creating a 
monograph system, but this had also failed.  Finally, it was now embroiled 
in litigation brought by the generic companies to force it to implement 
ANDAs through rulemaking—though moving forward would undoubtedly 
trigger litigation by the innovators.  Indeed, innovators had intervened in the 
litigation brought by the generic companies.  Arguably there was little to do 
but support a statutory ANDA provision.  So while the agency had been an 
influential voice with respect to enactment of the Kastenmeier bills, the 
nuances of the innovative industry’s opposition to the final Hatch-Waxman 
legislation related to issues of patent law outside its purview, and the broader 
legislation would remove a significant source of stress on the agency. 
In addition to the Baptists-and-bootleggers alliance, Representative 
Waxman’s support for the generic industry’s policy goals was pivotal.  
Professor Sachs, in describing the history of the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments, has referred to Waxman as a legislative entrepreneur, which 
is clearly correct.  Waxman was a member of the House for only four years 
and at the start of a long career when the first patent restoration bill was 
 
fibrosis, myasthenia gravis, and emphysema). 
 466  Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Weinberger, 425 F. Supp. 890 (D.D.C. 1975); Conditions 
for Marketing Human Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 43,531 (Sept. 22, 1975) (withdrawing 
policy in response to court’s order). 
 467  The agency published the first list in 1980.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (1st ed. 
1980). 
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introduced—he was in his early 40s during the key years of the debate.468  In 
the negotiations leading to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments, Waxman positioned himself as a champion for the public’s 
interest in earlier access to less expensive drugs.  This was one of his first 
pieces of health legislation, and it would bear his name and be viewed as one 
of his most significant accomplishments.469  For the remainder of his career, 
Waxman would be deeply involved in health legislation and amendments to 
the FDCA. 
V. CONCLUSION 
By reviewing the history of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments from a 
public choice perspective, this Article discounts the role of ideas, and 
perhaps it should not.  The innovators and generic companies sought policy 
outcomes that would further their respective financial interests, to be sure, 
but policymakers may have seen the policy choices in terms of a deeper 
philosophical dispute and may have been, at times, relatively unmoved by 
lobbying.  The many materials that collectively comprise the history of this 
legislation give the impression that the principals, at least, meaning Senator 
Hatch, Representative Waxman, and possibly others, were motivated, in 
part, by a desire to enact legislation that would solve a difficult problem the 
right way by setting the right length of time for innovators to enjoy 
exclusivity.  This surely played a role in the outcome. 
Nevertheless, it is also clear that the alliance between the generic 
companies and Public Citizen, and the virtual equating of the generic 
industry’s financial interests and the public’s interests, made enactment of 
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments possible. 
The contextualized history of the legislation thus leads to a conclusion 
that differs from conventional assumptions in the scholarship and cases.  As 
enacted, from a pure before-and-after perspective, the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments imposed a net cost on the innovating drug companies and 
conferred a net benefit to the generic drug companies.  The innovators 
received patent term restoration, but it was neutralized by an experimental 
use exception to infringement.  They did not receive data exclusivity; they 
lost rights to their data after five years.  Although the innovators obtained a 
statutory stay on generic drug approval during patent litigation, this litigation 
 
 468  See Waxman, Henry Arnold, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES: UNITED STATES HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/People/Listing/W/WAXMAN,-Henry-Arnold-
(W000215)/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2018). 
 469  E.g., U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE MINORITY 
STAFF, REP. HENRY A. WAXMAN’S RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS (2014), 
https://kaiserhealthnews.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/waxman-record-of-accomplishments-
2014-1-30.pdf. 
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would be happening a handful of years earlier in the lifecycle of their drugs, 
thanks to the abbreviated application pathway and experimental use 
exception.  Not only is it incorrect to state that the scheme benefitted patent 
owners, but when the legislation as a whole is examined, the notion that the 
generic drug bill advanced more than one private interest should be rejected. 
The central claim of this Article—that, because of a Baptist-and-
bootleggers alliance between generic drug companies and Public Citizen, the 
legislation benefitted the generic industry rather than the innovating 
industry—is descriptive, not normative.  It may, however, have implications 
for normative scholarship today. 
Over the last thirty years, some stakeholders and policymakers have 
been reluctant to discuss reform (let alone replacement) of the Hatch-
Waxman framework because of the conventional wisdom that the 
compromise was hard-fought, and the balance between innovators and 
generic companies both careful and fragile.  In recent years, though, others 
have advocated reform—although not a fundamental reassessment—on the 
ground that the scheme is too favorable for innovators.  Some claim that it 
was always pro-patent-owner.  Most claim that the scheme has become too 
favorable.  Under the circumstances, the notion that the Hatch-Waxman 
legislation may have harmed the innovating industry should give scholars, 
stakeholders, and policymakers pause. 
A great deal has happened in the more than thirty years since enactment 
of the legislation.  The FDA and the courts have interpreted provisions 
differently than perhaps was expected—sometimes in ways that favored 
innovators, and at other times in ways that favored generic companies.  
Regulated companies—both innovators and generic companies—have 
naturally found ways to use the enacted law (and the new interpretations) to 
their advantage, including in ways that probably no one expected.  Criticisms 
of the innovators, in particular, focus on perceived attempts to extend 
exclusivity in the marketplace.  Innovators are accused of “evergreening” 
and “product hopping,” using citizen petitions to block generic approval, and 
inappropriately refusing to sell products to their competitors for comparative 
tests, for instance, all with a view to achieving a longer period of exclusivity 
in the market.  Thus, many argue, the “balance” in 1984 between innovators 
and generic companies has now been “tilted”—by the innovators, if not also 
perhaps the courts and agency—in favor of patent owners.  A large body of 
normative scholarship, working from a historical baseline of balance in 
1984, presses policymakers to take steps to rein in the actions of patent 
owners, but if the Hatch-Waxman Amendments of 1984 were actually a 
policymaking defeat for the innovating industry, this normative work may 
be starting from the wrong premise. 
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The 1984 legislation created what is now a multi-billion dollar generic 
drug industry.  Consumers and payers benefit from generic drug pricing on 
important medicines every day.  But serious normative work on the future of 
the Hatch-Waxman framework should start with a clear understanding of 
what actually happened in 1984.  And it may need to be bolder, that is, 
reflecting on the consequences of that defeat, the arguments made then by 
the patent owners, and the possibility that the public’s interest would actually 
be best served by reforms that shift the landscape in the other direction. 
 
